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Su m m it Revives'E u ropean/ Spirit
AGREEMENT  REACHED ON ENLARGING AND STRENGTHENING COMMUNITY
TUU MEMBERs  ot: f lrF- EURopEAN  ( oMMUNIt y havc agrecd to
rpcn nrcmbership  ncgotiations with Britain, Denntark,  Irelancl,
lnd Norway-thc four countrics  that sLrbmittccl applications in
1967. At the encl of thcir sunrntit nrccting on Decembcr l-2 in
fhc Haguc, thc leaclers ol thc Six issuccl a communiqu6  in
which "thcy rcallirnrccl thcir agrccnrcnt on the principlc of
broadenrng thc (-omntunity.  as lirrcsccn in Articlc 237 of the
freaty of Rontc." Although thc conrmuniqtri dicl not set a
latc for thc opcnirrg ol talks, Dutch Prcnticr Piet clc Jong,
;hairnran of thc nrccting, tolcl a prcss confcrcnce that all six
Jclcgations  hacl unclcrtakcn  to re ach a joint rregotiating  posi-
:iorr by thc cncl of Junc 1970. "-thc will lirr cnlargcnlent exists.
I-hcrc is no clivcrgcncc ol vicw on intcrpretation," Mr. de Jong
;aid.
Thc nrain points ol thc cor.nnruniqrr6, publishccl  in its en-
ircty on pagc 5. werc:
) to carry out thc lask of con-rplcting  thc Commtrnity
I to dnrw up clefinitivc  firrancial arrangcmcnts for the common
arnr l.rolicy by thc cnd ol'1969. Thesc coulcl be adapted to
:hangcd concliliorrs, such as cnlargcnrcnt. if thc mcmbcr states
,vcrc unanimotrs.
) to continuc cllorts bv thc (-ouncil ol Ministcrs to cut down
thc currcnt agricr.rltural surpluscs
o to clevclop an cconontic union antong the Markct ntembers.
inclucling thc crcation of a Europcan reserve  fund
.  to push ahcacl with technological  coopcration
.  to make ncw cffrtrts to clraw up a rcscarch progrant for the
Europcan  Atomic Encrgy Community  (Euratom.l
o to consicier thc rcform of thc European Social Fund, within
thc contcxt ol'conccrtcd  social policies
.  to rcaflirm intcrest in setting up a Europcan univcrsity
.  to ask thc ContmLrnity's  forcign ministers to propose, bcforc
July 1970, ways of strcrrgthcning thc political r-rr.rification of
thc Contnrunity.
-faking part in the summit talks, originally schcdr-rled for
Novcmbcr l7-13, werc Italian Premier Mariano Rumor, Ger-
rnan ('harrccllor Willy Branclt, Frcnch Prcsiclent  Gcorges
I)ompickrrr, Dutch Prcnricr Pict dc Jong, Bclgian Prenticr
Gaston  E.yskens, Frcnch Printc M iniste r Jacqucs Chaban-
Dclnras, ancl frorcigrr Ministcrs Alclo Moro, Italy; Gaston 'fhorn, I-uxcnrbourg:  Maurice  Schtrmann, France: Pierre
Harmcl,  Bclgiunr: Joseph Ltrns, Holland:  ancl Waltcr  Schecl,
Gcrmany. ('ontnrission I)rcsiclcnt Jcan Rcy attcnclecl the sccond
tlay of thc srrnrnrit nlct:ting."Enough Blah-Blah"
Proposecl  by President  Pompidou to discuss the "complction,
dccpcning.  and enlargement" of thc Community,  the top-level
confercnce was widely regarded as a bid by the Six to give
the Community  a ncw lease on life and, in particular, to end
the deadlock on Britain's application,  which, it was felt, had
slowed down progress in several other sectors of the Commu-
nity's activitics. After the close of the meeting, held in the
thirtccnth-century Hall of  Knights, most participants  an-
nounced  that they regarded The Hague meeting as a success.
Demonstrations and press conferences  by various militant
European  groups accompanicd the opening of the summit.
Youthful European federalists. chanting "Enough blah-blah,"
struggled with Dutch mounted police. They bore a coffin sym-
bolizing the demise of the ideal of European  unity and staged
a sit-clown dcmonstration in thc street to make the point that
govcrnments  had lost touch with the people.
Youth l<tr Europc, irr u trto<'k lunerul procc.tsittrt,  protcsted tlrc
dcrnise ol tlre Europeart urtity rttorernurt otr tlte opertirtg  day ol tlrc
suntntit.  Bcaring pluttograplt,s ol the t'ourilittg lathers ol Europa
(ltere. Konrad Adetnucr),  thev cltantad,  "Enouglt  blah-blalt!"  until
noutiled police broke up lhe dentortslration.
Frenclt  Presictet* Georges  Pontpitlou antl German  Chungellor  Wi
Bratult  ntade tlteir public diplontatic (lebuts on thc "Europert
sccne irr lltcir trcw positions  of ntttiottal leatlersltip.
Satisfaction  Expressed with Results
Community  ollicials and thc heads of governments  alike wt
attended  thc summit  expressed  satisfaction with its results.
German  Chancellor Willy Brandt told newsmen it was '
big step forward." Asked, "Did yoLr succeed?", Mr. Bran,
replied unhesitatingly, "Yes." French Foreign Minister Mar
rice Schumann  said he saw no rcason why preparatory tall
for negotiations should take thc Community any longer tht
six months. French President  Pompidou, in a statement broar
cast by the French radio after the conference, said: "I cz
say this conference was a happy one for France and hapl
for Europe, for which it opens new hopes." Without mer
tioning dates, IVIr. Pompidou  said it was agreed that the S
were ready to discuss admission of Britain and the oth,
three applicants. He said the preparatory  talks would ope
"in a positive spirit." Belgian Foreign Minister Pierre Harm
said: "For those who follow Europe, this is a happy day
German Foreign Minister Waltcr Scheel said: "We ha'
achicved something which coulcl lead the European  Econom
Commr.rnity out of stagnation and into a dynamic  develo'
ment." He praised Mr. Pompidou's "constructive  role."
Commission's Reaction
The Commission on December l2 announced  that the dec
sions made in The Hague strikingly disproved  accusations th
the Community  was paralyzetl and losing momentum. It sa
it was particularly satisfied that the member states had unde
taken:
.  to enact measures by December 31, 1969, to complete  tl
Community
r to adopt definitive  regulations on financing the commc
agricultural  policy
.  to strengthen the Community and move toward econom
and monetary union.
The Commission  said it believed negotiations  to enlarge tl
Comnrunity  coulcl begin in micl-1970.  However, the Commi
sion said it was sorry the confcrcr-rce had not taken steps
further political union or expressed  itself in favor of tl
direct clcction of members of the European Parliament.COMMUNIQUE* 
Meeting of Heads of State or Government 
The Hague. December 1-2,  1969 
1.  On the  initiative of the Government of the  French Re-
public  and  at the  invitation  of the  Netherlands  Government, 
the heads of state or government and the ministers for  foreign 
affairs  of  the  member  states  of  the  European  Communities 
met at The Hague on  December I  and 2,  1969. The Commis-
sion of the European Communities was  invited  to  participate 
in the work of the conference on the second day. 
2.  Now  that the  Common Market  is  about  to  enter  upon 
its  final  stage,  they  considered  that  it  was  the  duty  of  those 
who  bear  the  highest  political  responsibility  in  each  of  the 
member states to draw up  a balance sheet of the work already 
accomplished, to show their determination to continue it,  and 
to define the broad lines for the future. 
3.  Looking back on  the  road  that  has been traversed,  and 
finding that never before have independent states pushed their 
cooperation  further,  they  were  unanimous  in  their  opinion 
that by reason of the progress made, the Community has now 
arrived  at a  turning point in  its  history.  Over and  above  the 
technical  and legal  sides of the problems involved,  the expiry 
of the transitional period at the end of the year has, therefore, 
acquired  major  political  significance.  Entry  upon  the  final 
stage of the Common  Market not only means confirming the 
irreversible  nature  of  the  work  accomplished  by  the  Com-
munities, but also  means paving the way for  a united  Europe 
capable of assuming its  responsibilities  in  the world of tomor-
row  and  of  making  a  contribution  commensurate  with  its 
tradations and its mission. 
4.  The  heads  of  state  or  government  therefore  wish  to 
reaffirm  their belief  in  the  political  objectives  which  give  the 
Community its  meaning  and  purport,  their  determination  to 
carry their  undertaking through  to  the  end,  and  their  confi-
dence in the final  success of their efforts.  Indeed, they have a 
common conviction  that a  Europe composed of states  which, 
in spite of their different national characteristics, are united in 
their essential  interests,  assured  of its  internal  cohesion,  true 
to its friendly relations with outside countries, conscious of the 
role  it  has to  play in  promoting the relaxation of international 
tension  and  the  rapprochement  among  all  peoples,  and first 
and foremost among those of the entire European Continent, 
is  indispensable if a mainspring of development,  progress and 
culture, world equilibrium,  and peace  is  to  be preserved. 
The  European  Communities  remain  the  original  nucleus 
from  which  European  unity  has  been  developed  and  intensi-
fied.  The  entry  of  other  countries  of  this  Continent  to  the 
Communities-in  accordance  with  the  provisions  of  the 
Treaties of Rome-would undoubtedly help the  Communities 
to grow  to  dimensions  more  in  conformity  with  the  present 
state of world economy and technology. 
The creation of a  special  relationship  with other European 
states  which  have expressed a desire  to  that effect would also 
contribute  to  this  end.  A  development  such  as  this  would 
enable Europe to remain faithful to its traditions of being open 
to  the  world  and  increase  its  efforts  on  behalf of developing 
countries. 
5.  As regards the completion of the Communities, the heads 
of state or government reaffirmed the will  of their governments 
''This is  the official English text of the communique issued after the 
summit meeting. 
to  pass  from  the  transitional  period  to  the  final  stage  of the 
European Community and,  accordingly, to  lay down  a defini-
tive  financial  arrangement  for the common agricultural  policy 
by the end of 1969. 
They agreed progressively to  replace, within the framework 
of  this  financial  arrangement,  the  contributions  of  member 
countries by  their own  resources,  taking  into  account  all  the 
interests concerned, with the object of achieving in  due course 
the  integral financing of the Communities' budgets in  accord-
ance  with  the  procedure  provided  for  in  Article  20 I  of the 
Treaty establishing the EEC  [European Economic Community] 
and of strengthening  the  budgetary  powers  of the  European 
Parliament. The problem of the  method of direct elections is 
still being studied by the Council of Ministers. 
6.  They asked  the governments to  continue  without  delay, 
within the Council, the efforts already made to ensure a better 
control of the  market by  a  policy of agricultural  production 
making it possible to limit budgetary charges. 
7.  The acceptance of a  financial  arrangement for  the  final 
stage does  not exclude  its  adaptation  by  unanimous  vote,  in 
particular in  the light of an enlarged Community and on con-
dition  that  the  principles  of  this  arrangement  are  not  in-
fringed. 
8.  They reaffirmed their readiness to further the more rapid 
progress  of  the  later  development  needed  to  strengthen  the 
Community  and  promote  its  development  into  an  economic 
union.  They  are  of the  opinion  that  the  integration  process 
should result in  a Community of stability and growth. To this 
end  they agreed  that within the Council,  on  the  basis  of the 
memorandum presented by  the  Commission on February  12, 
1969,  and  in  close  collaboration  with  the  latter,  a  plan  in 
stages  should  be worked out during  1970  with  a  view  to  the 
creation of an  economic  and  monetary  union.  The  develop-
ment of monetary cooperation should depend on  the harmoni-
zation  of economic policies. 
They  agreed  to  arrange  for  the  investigation  of  the  pos-
sibility  of setting  up  a  European  Reserve  Fund  in  which  a 
joint  economic  and  monetary  policy  would  have  to  result. 
9.  As  regards the technological activity of the  Community, 
they reaffirmed their readiness to continue more intensively the 
activities of the Community with  a  view  to coordinating and 
promoting industrial research and development in  the principal 
sectors  concerned,  in  particular  by  means  of  common  pro-
grams, and to supply the financial means for the purpose. 
10.  They further  agreed  on  the  necessity  of making  fresh 
efforts to work out in the near future a  research program  for 
the European Atomic Energy Community designed in  accord-
ance  with  the  exigencies  of  modern  industrial  management, 
and making it possible to ensure the most effective use  of the 
common research center. 
11.  They reaffirmed their interest in  the  establishment of a 
European university. 
12.  The heads of state or government acknowledge the  de-
sirability of reforming the Social Fund, within  the  framework 
of a  closely concerted social  policy. 
13.  They reaffirmed their agreement on the principle of the 
enlargement  of  the  Community,  as  provided  by  Article  237 
of the Treaty of Rome. 
In so far as the applicant states accept the Treaties and their  5 6 
political finality,  the decisions taken since the entry into force 
of the Treaties and the options made in the sphere of develop-
ment,  the  heads  of state  or government  have  indicated  their 
agreement to the  opening of negotiations  between  the  Com-
munity on the one hand and the applicant states on the other. 
They agreed  that  the  essential  preparatory  week  could  he 
undertaken  as  soon  as  practically  and  conveniently  possible. 
By common consent,  the  preparations would  take place  in  a 
most positive spirit. 
14.  As  soon  as  negotiations  with  the  applicant  countries 
have been opened, discussion  will  be  started  with  such  other 
EFTA  [European  Free  Trade  Association]  members  as  may 
request them on their position in  relation to the  EEC. 
15.  They agreed to instruct the ministers for foreign affairs 
to study the  best way of achieving progress  in  the matter of 
political  unification,  within  the  context  of  enlargement.  The 
ministers would be expected to report before the  end of July 
1970. 
16.  All the creative activities and the actions conducive to 
European growth decided upon here will be assured of a better 
future  if  the  younger  generation  is  closely  associated  with 
them. The governments arc  resolved  to endorse  this  and the 
Communities will make provision for it. 
PRESS  COMMENTS:  THE  SUMMIT 
CORRIERE DELLA SERA, AUGUSTO  GUERRIERO,  Milan,  De-
cember 4,  1969 
"The  key  event  of  The  Hague  conference  was  the  speech 
given  by  Pompidou at the  opening session.  .  .  .  The  speech 
disappointed  and  embittered  the  'Europeans.'  But  their  pes-
simism  is  perhaps  excessive.  What Pompidou  said,  whatever 
his reasons and purposes, is logical enough. It is in the interest 
of all-of the Six as  well  as of London-before deciding on 
British entry,  to define  the nature of the Community so  that 
the Six can agree completely among themselves on the condi-
tions  to  propose  for  membership,  and  so  that  England  will 
know the form and direction of the Community that it intends 
to join." 
ALGEMEEN  HANDELSBLAD,  Amsterdam,  December  3, 
1969 
"The French political will to arrive with the British at a  solu-
tion of the problem of British entry is apparent in the declara-
tions made by the French President. ...  The French obtained 
an  impressive  diplomatic  success.  The strong position of the 
German Federal Republic has also come to light ....  " 
DE STANDAARD, Brussels, December 4, 1969 
"First completion of what already exists and only then enlarge-
ment:  this was finally accepted by France's partners." 
LA  LIBRE  BELGIQUE,  Brussels,  December 4,  1969 
"Only the  future  will  tell  the  aftermath  of this  encouraging 
summit in The Hague, but there is a  reasonable hope that the 
very ambitious intergovernmental declaration will  be achieved 
progressively  and  realistically. 
LE MONDE, Paris, December 6,  1969 
"Like all  human efforts, [the European commitment] can only 
progress hy compromises of the  kind reached in  The Hague, 
on top of many others ....  Despite all the difficulties still to be 
surmounted, Europe has thus taken a step which  it is  perhaps 
too early to qualify as historic but which was at least the one 
necessary to get out of the rut." 
THE  TIMES,  DAVID  SPANIER,  London,  December  4,  1969 
"The significance of the summit meeting can easily  be  exag-
gerated. On the morrow of an involved  international meeting 
...  it is natural to feel  carried away. In this sense, the occasion 
could be seen as  the triumph of an ideal European unity over 
narrow sectional  interests.  Such a  judgment would  be rather 
premature, because unity in  Europe is  still  to  be won and  is 
still  far off.  But the idea,  though tattered perhaps, still  lives, 
and that is  the first proof from the summit. 
THE NEW YORK TIMES, New York, December 4, 1969 
"The wide-ranging decisions on economic and political  union 
just taken at the Common Market summit meeting will  do as 
much to spur British entry as  the  agreement to  open negotia-
tions with London by July. 
"The Hague communique, which contains some hard-fought 
compromises over vested  interests,  reads  astonishingly like  a 
manifesto of Jean Monnet's Action Committee for the United 
States of Europe ....  Perhaps the most significant aspect of 
The Hague compact was  the decision of the Six to move to-
ward  a  pooling  of  part  of  their  gold  and  foreign  currency 
holdings in a  European Reserve Fund ....  " 
THE WASHINGTON POST, Washington, D.C., December 5, 
1969 
"It cannot be said that the summit talk  proved or found  or 
added any new vigor  to  the European idea,  although an ex-
ception should perhaps be made for Willy Brandt, who is  alive 
to the evident interest of European youth in it. ... For Ameri-
cans,  as  for  Europeans,  it  makes  a  great  deal  of  difference 
whether Europe is becoming a larger political factor, or merely 
a  stronger  economic  competitor.  The  question  was  left  un-
answered,  unasked even,  at The Hague." 
LUXEMBURGER WORT,  Luxembourg,  December 4,  1969 
"The Hague  summit has  made  one  thing clear:  there  is  no 
longer  a  political  veto  hovering  over  meetings.  However, 
pleasure  at  this  accomplishment  should  not  delude  us  into 
minimizing  the  trials  that  not  only  the  EEC  but  all  of  free 
Europe still  face.  Whether they will  be overcome ultimately 
depends as much on London as on Paris and her partners ....  " 
FRANKFURTER  ALLGEMEINE  ZEITUNG,  voN  HANS 
HERBERT  GOTZ,  Frankfurt, December 4,  1969 
"In  the  past  weeks  all  participants  [at  The  Hague  meeting] 
had  a  glance  at  the  abyss  into  which  a  political  crisis  .  .  . 
would have plunged them ....  Problems still  exist.  However, 
the  confidence  regained  could give  the  members of the  EEC 
Council of Ministers enough strength ... to eliminate existing 
differences  now that a  continuation of the  integration  policy 
has  been decided  upon irrevocably." Britain  After The Hague 
I'ETER  JENKINS  1  staff member of The Guardian. 
"OT SURPRISINGLY THE  BRITISH reaction to the summit confer-
:nce of European leaders at The Hague was at first  cautious. 
Hard  experience  warned  against  over-optimism:  in  the 
;ummer of 196 7 there had been the tantalizing hope that Gen-
:ral Charles  de  Gaulle's veto  would not be  applied  a  second 
ime:  on many occasions during the role of the Grand Coali-
ion  in  Germany  hopes  of straight-talking by  Bonn to  Paris 
1ad  been  dashed  when  the  moment  came.  The  British,  it 
;hould  be  remembered,  have  been  waiting  for  nine  years 
'or a  fair chance to show their willingness and ability  to con-
'orm to the conditions for the enlargement of the Community 
aid down by the  Six  themselves.  Thus the  tone of President 
Pompidou's  speech  on  the  first  day  of  the  summit  meeting 
mt  British-watchers  on  their  guard  and  somewhat  colored 
heir  interpretation  of  the  compromise  reached  on  the  sec-
md  day. 
=ranee Plays Positive Role 
)n second reading, however, the results of The Hague meet-
ng  appeared  to  be  more  positive.  It became  evident  that 
:::hancellor  Brandt  believed  that  he  had  received  President 
:>ompidou's  solemn  word that  France would play  the  game, 
-vould  allow negotiations to be opened once a  common nego-
iating  posture  had  been  agreed,  and  was  prepared  for  the 
1egotiations to  be  conducted with good will.  It became more 
:!early understood that President Pompidou had misjudged the 
ttmosphere of the summit and the new force of the German 
Josition when giving his first  address. It was  also better real-
zed that the future of the Community and the prospects for 
ts enlargement would not have been well served by attempting 
o humiliate France publicly. 
There was some tough last-minute bargaining at The Hague, 
mt  there  was  also  a  good  deal  of  evidence  of  a  genuine 
:hange in Paris, certainly at the Elysee  even if the news had 
wt  carried  to  the  Quai  d'Orsay.  President  Pompidou,  it 
;eemed, had come to realize that in the interest of France the 
'British  question"  had  to  be  solved  one  way  or  the  other, 
hat  the  interest  of  France  lay  with  the  Community's  sur-
rival  and development, at least in certain directions.  For the 
:::ommunity  to survive and to develop at all,  the poison had 
o be drawn from the enlargement question. Therefore, a nego-
iation had to take place.  As to its result, it may well be that 
>resident  Pompidou  remains  neutral:  either it  will  produce 
,greement on Britain's accession, or it will show that Britain 
s unable or unwilling to accede on terms agreed upon among 
he  Six.  For  the  latter  result  to  be  acceptable  to  France's 
ive  partners,  the  terms  set  would  have  to  be  reasonable, 
nd seen  to  be  reasonable,  and the negotiations would have 
J  be conducted with a will to  succeed. 
:hange of Approach 
'his  analysis  is  reinforced  by the change  in  the French  ap-
roach  on  questions  of  Community  development.  Previous 
~rench policy involved opposition to European integrationist 
:>lutions  on strict ideological grounds; the new policy defines 
1e  interests of France on more pragmatic grounds, and thus 
dmits integration in areas where it may serve the interests of 
'ranee. 
The  change  has  profound  implications,  for  in  order  to 
further  its  interests  within  the  Community,  France  will  be 
obliged to take a  more constructive  attitude towards the  pre-
occupations  of  its  partners.  In  that  sense,  President  Pompi-
dou's  constructive  proposals  for  monetary  and  economic 
cooperation  arc  the  best  indications  of  a  genuinely  more 
constructive approach to enlargement. 
Britain's Stake 
The  attitude  of  France  is  by  no  means  the  only considera-
tion. British opinion tends naturally, after the years of humili-
ating  veto.  to  focus  on the  question  of enlargement  and,  in 
particular, on the line  taken by  Paris.  The existing members 
of the  Community were  looking  to  the  summit  to  do  more 
than  agree  on  a  timetable  for  preparing  negotiations;  they 
were looking for acts of statesmanship sufficient to revive the 
morale of the Community and set it  in  motion once more. 
This was, or should have been, just as  important for Britain 
as  the  enlargement  question  pure  and  simple.  For.  in  the 
first  place,  the  success  of  negotiations  is  going  to  depend 
very  greatly  upon  the  progress  the  Six  make  in  sorting out 
the  contradictions  in  the  common  agricultural  policy.  In-
formed  opinion  in  Britain  recognizes  that  the  principle  of 
financial  solidarity  and  the  system of Community preference 
have  to  be  accepted,  and  that  Britain  will.  in  any  event, 
have  to  pay  a  price  fur  the  commercial  and  political  bene-
fits  of  membership.  The  best  way  of  making  the  price 
reasonable would be to improve control over agricultural pro-
rlnction  and ensure that the unavoidably large sums spent on 
support  and  structural  reform  achieved  the  desired  result 
and  did not  continue,  as  at  present,  to  enrich  unnecessarily 
the efficient producer while  doing little  to solve the problems 
of the marginal farmer or curb his surplus production offered 
at exorbitant prices.  Seen in this  way, the interests of Britain 
and  the  Community  member  governments  are  not  so  dis-
similar:  for  it  has  become  imperative  for  the  Germans  to 
set  some limit  on their budgetary contributions  to  the  com-
mon  agricultural  policy,  and  the  French Government is  not 
content to continue devoting 12 per cent of its national budget 
to the agricultural sector, a  sum far  in  excess of the  receipts 
from Community resources. 
Positive  progress  towards  agricultural  reform  links  up 
intrinsically  with  progress  towards  monetary  and  economic 
union. Although the British naturally do not wish to be faced 
with further faits accomplis (it ought to be possible to devise 
a  form of consultation on these questions), the strengthening 
of the Community should be welcomed in London as evidence 
that it remains worth joining.  Public opinion in  Britain may 
be expected to warm again towards Europe as  the long cold 
spell  gives  way  to  thaw.  With  both  major  parties  equally 
divided  on  the  question of British  membership,  there  is  no 
danger of either  party's finding  it to  its  advantage  to  break 
away  from  the  consensus  in  an  election  year.  Continental 
speculations  on  this  score  have  been  vastly  exaggerated. 
Nevertheless,  British  public  opinion will  require  gentle  nurs-
ing;  and  no  less  important  than  the  early  opening  of 
negotiations,  in  good  spirit,  will  be  concrete  evidence  that 
the  Community is  capable  of tackling  its  internal  problems, 
notably in the agricultural field.  7 8 
Europe in the Seventies 
STEPHEN  HUGH-JONES 
HOW  SERIOUS  ARE  THE  FRE:"JCH'.'  The  seeming  change  in 
France's  attitude  towards  Britain's  membership  in  the  Euro-
pean  Community  has  hecn  much  debated.  However.  a  more 
striking  change  has  received  curiously  little  attention:  the 
expressed  intention  of  French  President  Georges  Pompidou 
to sec  the European Community develop in  the economic and 
monetary  fields.  These,  after  all.  are  major  areas  of  govern-
ment action. If the current French Government is  prepared to 
let  a  supranational  Community  have  a  major  role  in  these 
areas-although that is  not  how  Paris  now  phrases  its  inten-
tion- it  would  be  a  striking  and  hopeful  advance.  This,  no 
less  than  the  enlargement  of  the  Community,  is  the  key  to 
the Europe of the 1970's. 
It  is  now  a  reasonable  bet  that  the  Community  will  be 
enlarged.  But what kind of Community will  it  be? Quite pos-
sibly  an  enlarged Community could match,  in  some  respects, 
the horror comic sketched out  (ingenuously or not)  by some 
of its traditional denigrators. It could, that is,  stand still.  Com-
munity  influence  would  be  extended  into  few  new  areas  of 
economic  decision.  Under  a  thin  guise  of  international  co-
operation,  national  industrial  and  economic  policies  would 
remain the order of the clay.  The powers of the  Commission 
and  of the  European  Parliament would  develop  little.  Above 
all,  the Community would  develop  no  political  wilL  It  would 
be more than an extended free-trade area, but not much more, 
a  quite  natural  consequence  of  the  nationalistic  atmosphere 
that has infected Europe in  the last few  years. 
What are the  reasons for hoping it  will  not  happen? One is 
the  lessening  of  American  interest  in  Europe.  The  United 
States  may  well  withdraw  more  of its  troops.  Unless  simul-
taneously the  nature of the Soviet  regime changes remarkably 
for the better, Europeans will be forced to think more seriously 
of  their  common  defense.  Defense  integration  will  follow 
political  integration,  not  precede it-that was  the  illusion  on 
which  the  European  Defense Community  foundered  in  1954 
-hut  a  cooperative  defense  effort  will  help  to  push  the 
nation states together. 
The  Americans  arc  starting,  too,  to  think less  of Western 
Europe as  a  political  partner and to  see it,  in  the short term, 
at any rate, more as  a commercial rival. The conflict between 
American  and  European economic  interests  must sharpen-
every Eurodollar and every American  investment sharpens it 
-and Europeans will  be forced  to recognize clearly that "We 
must  all  hang  together,  or assuredly  we  shall  all  hang sepa-
rately,"  as  Benjamin  Franklin observed  at  the  signing of the 
Declaration of Independence. 
Another  reason  lies,  paradoxically,  in  Europe's  hope  of 
making a  deal  with the Russians.  We  may fear them;  but,  as 
the  difference  between  American  and  European  reactions  to 
Czechoslovakia showed,  we  feel  a  need,  as  the United States 
does not, to talk with them about the divisions of Europe and 
conditions  in  the  Russian  half of it.  Neither Paris nor Bonn 
carries enough  weight  by  itself  to  make  any  kind  of serious 
deal  or,  indeed,  to  have  any  serious  influence  on  Russian 
actions. United, Western Europe might. 
But why does one want an integrated Community anyway? 
Stephen  Hugh-Jones  is  European  correspondent  of  The 
Economist. 
What  is  the  Community  for')  Opinions  will  certainly  difler. 
For a  start, open conflict  can  he  foreseen  between  "Atlanti-
cists'' and ''Europeans." a  division  smudged until  recently  be-
cause  the  most  anti-Atlantic  member country  in  theory  was 
also  least  keen,  in  practice,  on creating  "Europe."  The  new 
members-Britain especially-the Dutch, and the Italians will 
have to  decide where they stand. lf serious  industrial integra-
tion  is  attempted,  it  will  conceivably  be  accompanied  by  an 
attempt to  reach  a  common  policy  on  American  investment: 
but the  result,  if  there  is  one,  will  probably  not  be  strongly 
hostile  to the  American  invaders.  IRM  is  in  Europe to stay-
to  which many European industrialists will  add, "and a  good 
thing,  too." 
Defense may  be similarly controversial.  Does Europe want 
to  stay  beneath  the  American  nuclear  umbrella?  Is  Europe 
prepared  to  pay for,  and  run  the  risks  of,  putting  up one of 
its own? Here I believe, regretfully, that the "Europeans" will 
be  outnumbered; the non-proliferation treaty,  and Germany's 
special status apart, it is  always easier to let other people carry 
the  burden.  Anglo-French  cooperation  can  be  imagined  in 
military and nuclear production. perhaps, and in  targeting, but 
all  within  the framework  of the North  Atlantic Treaty Orga-
nization  (NATO),  whose demise there is  no  reason to  predict. 
There  will  be  corresponding  differences  over  Western 
Europe's  relationship  with  its  eastern  neighbors.  Everyone 
will  be in favor of "good relations" as  everyone is  against sin, 
but on  what basis?  Trade and  economic  relations,  certainly. 
But are those the only liberalizing  influences one would  hope 
to spread to the east if, indeed, one hoped to spread anything: 
possibly too many of us are content to live comfortably on our 
side of the fence.  Shall we  rely  on deterrence or on a  system 
of pan-European security? It cannot easily be said  how these 
arguments will be worked out: hut clearly, they will be argued, 
just as they are now. European man is  a political animal, not a 
technocrat  for  whom  there  is  one,  and  only  one,  "optimal" 
(the word begs the question)  solution. 
New  Basis  for  European  Politics 
The  same  will  be  true  internally.  No  Social  Democrat,  let 
alone  Communist,  would  accept  as  God-given  truth  all  the 
principles  basic  to  the  Treaty  of  Rome.  Even  if  the  Com-
munity's development proceeded on that basis, acute disagree-
ment  must  arise  between  the  parties  as  soon  as  decisions 
affecting  their  interests  are  made  at  Community  level.  Poli-
tics  is  not just "the art of the  possible";  it  is  also  the dispute 
about what  is  possible-in brief,  about who  gets  what.  Many 
social  questions  arc  likely  still  to  be  settled  at  national  or 
regional level:  housing, education,  health services,  "participa-
tion" in  industry.  Others.  in  particular the fiscal  or monetary 
management  of  the  national  economies,  will  be  powerfully 
influenced by the Community as such. The old  basic questions 
about the  kind  of national society we  want-liberal, orderly, 
progressive,  capitalist,  socialist,  or  what  have  you-will  be 
argued  about afresh  in  the whole Community. 
This  is  the  most  general  sketch  of a  possible  future.  One 
has to  say,  at the end of 1969, that an  infinitely more dismal 
prospect is  still open. Suppose the British never enter the Com-
munity  at  all.  It could  be the  fault  of France,  but  it  could 
also be the  fault of the British. Leading  from  Behind 
While  Britain's  "anti-marketccrs"  are  enthusiastically  whip-
ping up opposition, its pro-Market politicians-with honorable 
exceptions  like  George  Brown-tend  to  behave  like  the 
Duke of Plaza-Toro who  "led his  regiment  from  behind-he 
found  it  less  exciting."  They  are  firm  for  Europe,  they  say, 
almost apologetically. They are not anxious to  frighten  a con-
servative electorate with thoughts of change.  Understandable: 
there is  an  election  ahead,  but great enterprises are  not built 
on apology, or on  looking backward. 
"European  Idea"  to  the  Fore? 
Another  hope  lies  in  the  impetus  that  will  be  given  to  the 
"European idea" if  the Community is  enlarged. The idea has 
been badly battered. If it seems to be moving forward again, it 
will gain fresh appeal, like all  bandwagons. This is  a precarious 
hope,  but  it  is  the  one  that  will,  or  could,  count  for  most: 
communities and nations are not made by fear or by economic 
convenience but by fellow-feeling. 
These and other forces could push the Community towards 
integration.  However,  the  victory  of integration,  if it occurs, 
over the nation state will  at  best be a qualified one. The status 
and, above all,  the resources (the two will  go  together) of the 
European institutions  will  be  crucial.  The presence of ten or 
more states  (hopefully a democratic Spain and Greece among 
them) will make it more necessary than ever for the European 
Community's Council of Ministers to  move beyond the power 
of national veto into the era of decision by majority. That will 
not count for  a  great deal  unless  the  Commission  gets  much 
larger  resources:  and  a  directly  elected  Parliament,  much 
larger powers. 
The proposals  now  on  the  table  carry us  up to  1974,  but 
they are extremely modest. The Commission proposes that its 
resources  should  not  exceed  1  per cent  of the  Community's 
gross  national  product,  although  most  national  governments 
take 30-35 per cent of their national GNP.  Unless an  astonish-
ing surge of federal  feeling materializes, national governments 
will  still  be  the  main  initiators  and  decision-makers  in  the 
Europe of 1980; and intergovernmental cooperation, albeit in 
a  spirit of good will  rather than the suspicion of the last few 
years, will still  play a major part in  framing common policies. 
If so,  neither  direct  election  nor  the  hoped-for  legislative 
powers of the European Parliament will  count for much. 
Economic  Realities 
The integrationists' answer will  lie,  in  part,  in  the  realities of 
modern  economic  life.  It  will  become  increasingly  clear that 
certain  policies-say, for  aviation  or energy  or computers-
can only be conducted on a European scale,  that the areas of 
Community  influence  must be  extended.  That will  imply  in-
creased resources, and ipso facto, whatever the formal balance, 
increased powers. 
As Europe  marshalls  its  resources  for  competition  in  the  seventies,  Americans  are  starting  to  see  Europe  as  a  commercial  rival.  Here, 
water  jets  cool hot-rolled steel at the  works in  Chertal,  Belgium,  owned  by  Esperance-Longdoz  which  recently  merged  with  Belgium's 
other  major  steel  producer,  Cockerii!-Ougr£!e-Providence.  PHOTO:  Courtesy  /nstitut  Beige  d'lnformation  et  de  Documentation,  Brussels. 10 
Washington's New Look 
at the Community 
BOYD  FRANCE 
THE  SUDDEN  REVIVAL  of  hope  that  Britain  may  join  the 
European Community,  after  seven  long  years of squatting at 
the gate,  has  stirred only  polite  applause  in  Washington.  In-
deed,  it  has  sparked  a  lively  debate  in  the  inner councils  of 
the  Nixon  Administration over how  much  the  United  States 
may stand  to  lose  economically,  and  even  whether  that  loss 
is  worth the  political  gain. 
The mere  fact  that  these  questions  could  be  seriously  de-
bated outside the drab  labyrinth of the  Department of Agri-
culture reflects  a changed attitude  in  Washington  towards the 
Community.  Political  interest  has  waned;  economic  appre-
hension, grown. 
The  Tarnished  Dream 
On July 4,  1962,  President John F. Kennedy  spoke for  a  big 
majority of American businessmen,  politicians,  academicians, 
and other thoughtful citizens when he said: 
"We do not  regard  a  strong  and  united  Europe  as  a  rival 
but a  partner ... capable  of playing  a  greater  role  in  the 
common  defense,  of  responding  more  generously  to  the 
needs of poorer nations, of joining with  the United States and 
others  in  lowering  trade  barriers,  resolving  problems  of 
commerce  and  commodities  and  currency,  and  developing 
coordinated policies in  all economic and diplomatic areas .. .. 
The  United  States  will  be  ready  for  a  declaration  of  inter-
dependence ....  We will  be prepared to discuss with  a.united 
Europe  the  ways  and  means  of forming  a  concrete  Atlantic 
partnership  .  .  .  between  the  new  union  now  emerging  in 
Europe and the  old American union founded  here  175  years 
ago." 1 
Now the bloom is off the rose. The talk in Washington, and 
New York,  and Boston-not to speak of Chicago and  points 
West-is of trade war more often than partnership.  And  the 
European Economic Community  (EEC)  is  cast in  the  role  of 
provocateur. 
Senator  Jacob  K.  Javits  (R-N.Y.)  long  a  liberal  inter-
nationalist  and  champion  of  close  U. S.  cooperation  with 
Europe, expressed the new mood this way in  a  recent speech: 
"I regret that the European Common Market is  increasingly 
taking  on the  appearance of  a  narrow,  inward  looking  pro-
tectionist bloc  whose trade policies  as  they  affect  agricultural 
as well  as industrial products increasingly discriminate against 
non-members .. . . Western Europe should know from a friend 
that the  CAP  [common  agricultural  policy],  as  it  is  presently 
constituted,  runs  the  risk  of  alienating  the  U.S.  farm  bloc 
which traditionally has had a liberalizing effect on U. S.  trade 
policy.  Such alienation  of support could be decisive." 2 
Former Secretary of Agriculture  Orville  L.  Freeman com-
plained recently to  a congressional committee: 
"The  decade  of  the  Sixties  has  witnessed  retrogression 
rather than progress in  world trade in agriculture. Regionalism, 
and  with  it  a  turning  inward,  particularly  in  the  European 
Economic Community, is largely  responsible . "~ 
Dr.  Harald  B.  Malmgren,  former Assistant Special  Repre-
sentative  for Trade Negotiations  in  the  White  House,  put it 
more bluntly after leaving office earlier this year: 
Mr.  France  is  Foreign  Affairs Correspondent  for  the  Wash-
ington  Bureau  of McGraw-Hill  Publications. 
'There is  no  longer any  reason  to  pay a  commercial  price 
for  non-existent  political  unity  in  Europe.  We should  be  far 
less  tolerant of the abuses of the Common Market agricultural 
policy but tailor our retribution so  that  it  does not hurt other 
countries.'' ·! 
And  Edwin  L.  Dale,  Jr.,  normally  judicious  international 
economic expert of The New York Times and once an ardent 
admirer of the Community, wrote of it  recently in  The  Times 
of London: 
"We hought a pig in  a poke. We have been  taken ... . The 
girl  looked gorgeous for awhile. But now she  is  all  warts. It is 
all  very human, but the time has come to cut our losses." " 
Sobering  Contrast 
The  contrast  between  such  caustic  remarks  and  Kennedy's 
vision  of Atlantic partnership  is  sobering,  but  it  would  be  a 
mistake to conclude that a tragic confrontation between Wash-
ington and Brussels is  imminent or inevitable. 
The underlying fact  is  that, however testy they may get, the 
United  States and  the  Community are  locked  together  in  an 
ever-tightening  web  of mutual  self-interest,  economic  as  well 
as  political.  This,  in  the  end,  will  hopefully  determine  their 
policies.  As  long as  each is  careful  not to  jostle the other too 
rudely  into  irrational and self-defeating actions,  this  common 
interest should eventually prevail over bad temper and political 
expediency.  Without  this  common  interest,  no  amount  of 
sentimental affection  could  avert  a  confrontation. 
There  is  something,  to  be sure,  of the  jilted  suitor  in  the 
current American disenchantment with  the Common  Market, 
as Jean-Fran<,:ois  Deniau, member of the European Communi-
ties  Commission,  remarked  in  commenting  upon  Dale's 
attack.6  The expectations expressed  hy  Kennedy for  a  global 
fraternal  condominium  with  a  miraculously  united  Europe 
were excessive.  So,  too, is  the U. S. reaction to dashed hopes. 
Beneath  such  emotions,  there  are  solid  reasons  for  the 
souring  of  American  regard  for  the  Community  to  which 
Europeans  probably  would  be  wise  to  be  attentive.  Many 
Americans  in  and  out of Government  have  come  to  feel  in 
recent years that the United States has less  to hope for  politi-
cally  from  the  Community  and  more  to  fear  from  it  com-
mercially. 
On the  political  side,  the  Community's lackluster  political 
performance,  Western  European  detachment  from,  or  hos-
tility  towards,  the  American ordeal  in  Vietnam,  the  receding 
Soviet threat to Europe, the United States' own, more modest, 
latterday  view  of its  world  mission  combine  to  cool  earlier 
American enthusiasm for the Community. 
On  the  economic side,  swelling  U. S.  balance-of-payments 
deficits,  dwindling trade surpluses,  falling  farm exports  partly 
attributable to protectionist Common Market policies combine 
to  inflame  fears  of  economic  damage  at  the  Community's 
hands. 
White House Watching 
Against this  background, many Europeans have  thought  they 
detected  evidence  of a  decisive  hardening  of  heart  towards 
the  Community  on  the  part  of  the  Nixon  Administration. 
They cite Nixon's warm embrace of de Gaulle in  Washington 
last  spring  and,  by  implication,  his  policies;  his  failure  to 
receive the President of the European Communities Commis-On  December 3, another in  the series of meetings took  place  in  Brusse/.1 · for an exchange of vieiVs  on problems conceming  both the Com-
munity  and  the  United  States.  Left  to  right:  Ambassador  J.  Robert Schaetze/, chief of the  U.S.  Mission  to  the Communities;  U.S.  Secre-
tary  of State  William  P.  Rogers,  allll  Jean  Rey,  President  of  the  European Communities Commission. 
sian, Jean Rey, during his  visit to Washington last spring; the 
careful  vagueness  of  Presidential  expressions  of  support  for 
"the  concept"  of  European  unity;  the  reputation  of  Henry 
Kissinger,  Nixon's  omnipresent  foreign  policy  advisor,  as  a 
practitioner of real po/itik  and  admirer of Bismarck's and de 
Gaulle's leadership style. 
Again  there  is  something  in  this,  but  less  than  meets  the 
eye.  True,  Nixon,  like  Johnson  before  him,  has  been  pre-
occupied  with  Vietnam.  (Actually, if  there  was  a  watershed 
in  the  U.S.  official  attitude  towards  the  Community,  it  was 
marked by  Johnson's decision  in  December  1964  to  sink  the 
multilateral  force  ( M LF)  of  nuclear  warheads  rather  than 
Nixon's  reconciliation with de Gaulle.)  Also,  this  has been a 
period  of enforced  pause  and  transition  on both  sides  of the 
Atlantic  as  Europe  accustoms  itself  to  the  absence  of 
de  Gaulle,  and  Washington,  to  the  presence  of Nixon. 
Beyond  that,  Nixon  and  Kissinger  are  conservative  men 
who are particularly attentive to power in  being. The spectacu-
lar political  weakness of the  Community has  not been  calcu-
lated to rivet their attention. 
But  all  this  seeming  inattention  to  U. S.-Community  rela-
tions  could  be  exaggerated.  The  fact  is  that  Nixon  and  his 
Administration-the  Department  of  Agriculture  excepted-
see the underlying interest of the United States in  strengthen-
ing  and  broadening the  European Community and  U.S. ties 
with  it  as  unchanged,  though U. S.  passion  for the Common 
Market  has  cooled  with  age.  In  part,  the  surface  impression 
of indifference to  the Community stems from  their conviction 
that  it  would  be  counterproductive  for  the  United  States  to 
seem to be trying to  push Europe into a  shotgun  wedding or 
to be  intervening in  European domestic quarrels. Kissinger, in 
an  article  published  by  the  Brookings Institution,  just  before 
his incarceration in  the White House silenced his public voice, 
put it this way: 
"All of this suggests that there is  no  alternative to  European 
unity either for the United States or for Europe. In its absence, 
the  malaise can only be  alleviated, not ended.  Ultimately,  this 
is  a  problem primarily for the Europeans.  In  the  recent  past, 
the  United  States  has  often  defeated  its  purposes  by  com-
mitting itself to one form of European unity-that of federal-
ism.  It  has  also  complicated  British  membership  in  the 
Common Market by making it  a direct objective of American 
policy." 7 
So  much  for  high  policy.  Kissinger  makes  no  attempt  to 
conceal  his  distaste for  economics. It is  on the level  of U. S. 
economic interest  in  an  enlarged Community that the  debate 
is  being  joined  within  the  Administration.  On  this  ground 
policy  may  well  be  decided  in  the  end,  now  that  political 
considerations are less overriding. For if it appeared that U.S. 
trade  and  its  balance  of  payments  stood  to  be  severely 
injured, it  is  highly  questionable  whether any  Administration 
could  again  subordinate this  consideration  to  will-of-the-wisp 
political gains in  the present peevish mood of the country. 
U.S.  Overreaction, a  Danger 
Harvard  professor Francis M.  Bator,  former  Deputy Special 
Assistant  to  President  Johnson  for  international  economic 
affairs,  recently  voiced  concern about the  possibility  of U. S. 
overreaction,  in  testimony  to  the Joint Economic Committee 
of Congress: 
"In the absence of American retaliation, the mere economic 
consequences of a much enlarged EEC would not be too harm-
ful,  certainly not to the United States .... If our exports grow 
a little more slowly for a few years, it  will  not be a  matter of 
life  and  death,  not even  for  particular  American  industries. 
The risk lies, rather, in  angry American overreaction." a 
There  is  more  at stake,  too,  than  trade  war,  cold  or hot, 
however ruinous it would be.  Clearly, it would shatter already  11 12 
wavering American support for a  continued large troop com-
mitment  to  the  North  Atlantic  Treaty Organization  (NATO). 
Monetary cooperation could well become impossible, too, with 
disastrous  political  repercussions.  If  there  is  any  question 
about  U.S.  political  interest  in  expanding  the  Community, 
there is  none about its  huge stake in  avoiding a confrontativn. 
There  is  general  agreement  that  on  overall  balance  the 
United States profited economically from the formation of the 
Common  Market in  its  first  decade.  U. S.  exports to  the Six 
rose by  153  per cent compared to an  84 per cent increase  to 
non-Community countries. Non-farm exports to  the Common 
Market  jumped  by  198  per  cent  compard to  90 per cent for 
exports  to  non-Community  countries.  True,  growth  in  U.S. 
non-agricultural  exports  to  the  Six  in  the  past  five  years  has 
lagged  behind  the  general  trend,  and  last  year  the  formerly 
fat U.S. trade surplus virtually disappeared. But in  1969 these 
trends  reversed,  and  the  impact of German  revaluation  and 
the  dampening  of  inflation  in  the  United  States  give  some 
grounds for optimism. 
U. S.  direct investment in  the Common Market doubled  in 
the  last  five  years  from  $4.5  billion.  Last  year,  for  the  first 
time, U. S.  income from these investments topped new capital 
outflows.  There  is  disagreement  over  the  net  impact  of this 
d1rect  investment on the U.S. balance of payments, hut there 
is  no  doubt  that  they  represent  an  increasingly  important 
economic  bond  between the  United States  and  the  Common 
Market.  For the  Community, they are an  indispensable  con-
duit  for  advanced  technology.  For  the  United  States,  they 
are, at the least, a hostage to fortune. 
However,  it  is  on  U. S.  agricultural  exports  to  the  Com-
munity that U. S.  official concern centers.  Here the picture is 
glummer. True, increases in Community imports of U.S. farm 
goods exceeded increases in  U. S.  total  exports of agricultural 
products by a  narrow margin during the  past ten  years and a 
fatter one during the  past five.  However, in  1967,  1968,  and 
through  the  fall  of  1969  U.S.  farm  exports  to  the  Com-
munity declined. The drop in fiscal year 1969 was  21  per cent. 
The U. S.  Department of Agriculture argues that since  virtu-
ally  all  of  the  decline  occured  in  products  subject  to  the 
Community's variable import levies,  the common agricultural 
policy is the only possible villain. 
Impact of United  Kingdom's  Entry 
U. S.  experience with the Community of Six  gives  some hazy 
guidelines for guessing the economic impact the United King-
dom's  membership  would  have  on  the  United  States.  The 
I could not leave Brussels, the capital of the European 
Community, without noting that the United States welcomes 
the renewed impetus from The Hague this week toward 
broadening and deepening the unification of Europe. We see 
this as a major step toward realization of the full constructive 
potential of Europe. An enlarged European Community 
would reflect more accurately than is now the case the 
reality of Europe's collective influence and potential-not only 
in an Atlantic context hut in world affairs in general. 
U.S. SECRETARY OF STATE WILLIAM P. ROGERS 
Excerpts from address to the Belgo-American Association,  Brussels, 
Belgium, December 6,  1969. 
Commission  President  Jean  Rcy  greets  U.S.  Secretary  of  the 
Treasury  Dm·id  M.  Kennedy  on  his  arrival  for  the  December  3 
meeting. 
general  expectation  in  Washington  is  that  U. S.  non-farm 
exports may benefit  from Britain's  inclusion  in  the  Common 
Market. The area of discrimination would be extended, but its 
level  lowered,  since  the  average  British post-Kennedy  Round 
tariff  of  12  per  cent  will  be  aligned  with  the  Community's 
7.5  per cent average.  Moreover, the spur to  economic growth 
within the enlarged market should boost overall U.S. exports 
-and direct investment-as happened after the  Community's 
formation.  Once in  the Community, Britain should strengthen 
those forces favoring an open trading policy. 
Again,  the  overall  outlook  is  murky  indeed.  Exports  to 
the  United  Kingdom  of  products  now  subject  to  the  Com-
munity's variable  levies  or which  enjoy  a  high  level  of  pro-
tection-principally  grains,  rice.  meat,  and  fruit-amounted 
to about $160 million last year. This figure  perhaps represents 
the  extreme  limit  of  direct  U.S.  vulnerability.  Some  pre-
liminary estimates  by U. S.  officials  suggest  that  total  British 
imports  of  grains-the  biggest  item  likely  to  be  affected-
might  drop by  as  much as  3  million  tons,  or $150  million  a 
year,  if  Britain  came  under  the  common  agricultural  policy 
as presently constituted. Of that grain import decline, the U.S. 
share  might he about  $60 million.  Indirect ettects  could  also 
include  increased  British  grain  production,  in  response  to 
higher  prices,  and  pressure  on  other  U.S.  export  markets 
from displaced farm imports. 
There  could  be  some  unmeasurable  offsets.  U.S.  tobacco 
and  cotton  exports  to  the  United  Kingdom,  for  instance, 
might benefit from elimination of Commonwealth preferences. 
The  complexity  of  the  calculation  and  the  variety  of  in-tangibles  involved  thus  make  prediction  an  exercise  in  the 
wildest sort of guesswork.  At face  value.  however,  the figures 
do  not  suggest  that  in  straight  economic  terms  the  United 
States  would  face  a  catastrophic  loss  of  farm  exports  as  a 
result  of the entry of the  United Kingdom  into  the  Common 
Market.  Indeed, some high officials,  concerned primarily with 
political  hopes  for  a  stronger  Europe  and  fears  of  a  U. S.-
Community confrontation,  scoff  at the  farmers'  forebodings. 
Said one: "Doing these grubby little sums is a form of idiocy!" 
But with  overall U. S.  farm exports drooping,  for  a  variety 
of  reasons  besides  the  Community's  farm  policies-such  as 
the success  of the Green Revolution  in  some  places  and  the 
dwindling  of  Congressional  appropriations  for  food  aid  to 
developing countries-any significant prospective loss  of sales 
to  Europe could prove a politically explosive threat.  It's worth 
noting  in  that connection that the Department of Agriculture 
no longer is  fighting alone within the Administration. Its  argu-
ments  are  getting  a  sympathetic  hearing  from  Commerce 
Secretary  Maurice  H.  Stans,  from  the  Treasury,  the  Federal 
Reserve, and other agencies worried about the  reeling  balance 
of payments and plummeting trade surpluses. 
A  high  official  sympathetic  to  the  Community's  problems 
ruefully commented: 
"I have regretfully concluded that, whatever the economic' 
may  be,  the  political  reality  is  that  for  Britain  to  enter the 
Common Market at its  present support levels would be simply 
unacceptable to the United States." 
The hope, of course,  is  that Britain,  whose  interests  in  the 
farm  area coincide with those  of the  United States,  will  suc-
ceed in negotiating a lower level of CAP  price supports as  part 
of the  terms  of membership.  Community  price  supports  are 
some  40 per cent higher than  those  in the  United Kingdom. 
The  hope  is  buttressed  by  the  impression  that  Community 
members find the cost of present supports increasingly onerous 
and  that  they  are  increasingly  sensitive  to  the  dangers  of  a 
confrontation with the United States. 
Longer  Term  Considerations 
Even  if  it  proves  possible  to  limit  the  immediate  da;nage  to 
U. S.  farm exports, longer-term concern with the  implications 
of the Common Market enlargement are  beginning to surface 
in  Washington.  The  concern  extends  not  merely  to  British 
entry  but  to  the  expansion  of  the  Community's  preferential 
trading area  to  other  members  of the  European  Free  Trade 
Association  (EFTA)  and more widely, through Central Europe, 
the  Mediterranean Basin,  and  Africa.  One  official  voiced  his 
worry this way: 
"The creation of an  ever larger  area  of preferential  trade 
cannot be  an  objective  of American  policy. If this  proves  to 
be  all  there  ;~  to  it,  if it  proves to be  not  a  means to political 
unity but an  end  in  itself,  we  shall  have  to  rethink our entire 
position." 
Nathaniel  Samuels,  Deputy  Under  Secretary  of  State  for 
Economic Affairs,  formulated  the  question  in  these  terms: 
"Our thoughts should turn  to the harmonization of policies 
rather than  the  compromising of conflicts.  We  might also  be 
justified  in  asking  whether  the  discriminatory  trade  features 
of the Common Market really  must continue to  be central to 
the whole  idea of the Community, or whether the  more  pro-
found ideological  forces at work in  Europe which gave  rise  to 
the  Community, and  the institutions and  outlook  which  have 
emerged, are not fundamentally more powerful  and can carry 
it  to  greater unity and higher achievement.''' 
Behind this is  the budding feeling  in  some influential  circles 
in  Washington  that-assuming  that  confrontation  can  be 
avoided-the  enlargement  of  the  Community  at  some  stage 
will  demand a  heroic  new assault  upon  remaining barriers to 
trade  and  investment  on  at  least  the  scale  of  the  Kennedy 
Round. Bator, in his testimony, saw this as  the only way out of 
eventual confrontation. He said: 
"The  need  is  to  cut  all  tariffs  [on  an  accelerateu,  non-
reciprocal  schedule  toward the  poor countries]  and-increas-
ingly  important as  tariffs go  down,  as  the  President's message 
fully  recognized-the thick  underbrush  of  non-tariff  barriers 
as  well.  The implication  is  another ambitious  round  of trade 
negotiations  starting  rather  sooner  than  the  Administration 
seems to have in  mind." 3 
Professor Richard N. Cooper of Yale, who has been a con-
sultant to the Nixon White House on foreign economic policy, 
is  looking in the same general direction. In his statement to the 
Joint  Economic  Committee  he  called  on  the  Community  to 
take the initiative: 
'Today,  the  European  Community has  by  far  the  largest 
trade  with  the  rest  of the  world  and  by  historical  precedent 
the mantle of leadership should pass to it." 3 
Any such brave new departure, however, will  have to  await 
the  consummation  of British  membership  and  the  evolution 
of Nixon's long-range trade strategy. The latter is  the focus  of 
the  current Joint Economic Committee study and will  be  the 
object of the  blue  ribbon Committee on  World Trade which 
Nixon will  name shortly.  Both Committees are due  to  report 
by the end of next year. 
Meanwhile,  those officials  in  Washington  who  still  cling  to 
Kennedy's  dream,  however  faded,  and  struggle  against  the 
Department of Agriculture's nightmare-and they still  are  in 
the  majority-have  been  greatly  heartened  by  the  apparent 
new life which was breathed into the spirit of European unity 
and  Atlantic  cooperation  at The  Hague  summit  conference. 
For as President Kennedy said: 
"The two  great Atlantic  markets  will  either grow  together 
or they will grow apart. ...  That decision either will  mark the 
beginning  of  a  new  chapter-or  a  threat  to  the  growth  of 
Western unity." 9 
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Europe  Is More  Than a Farm Po lie} 
PIERRE  S.  MAL  VE 
THERE  IS  A  WORRISOME  AND  GROWING  tendency in  the United 
States to consider the European Community only in  terms of 
its common  agricultural  policy.  While some of your concerns 
and anxieties arc understandable, some misconceptions should 
be  cleared  up  and  agriculture  put  into  its  proper  context  as 
merely one aspect of a  newly emerging Europe, both economi-
cally and politically  united. The United States cannot dissoci-
ate itself from Europe's efforts towards unity.  Both sides have 
to  make  the  effort  to  understand  each  other's  situation 
and  problems  and  find  solutions  conducive  to  coexistence 
and  cooperation.  We  cannot  let  the  common  agricultural 
policy  become  a  source of conflict  between  us. 
Context  of  Common  Farm  Policy 
The  meaning  of  the  common  agricultural  policy  cannot  be 
understood without reference to the circumstances of its devel-
opment.  First of all,  in  a  field  as  difficult  as  agriculture,  the 
formulation  of  a  common  policy  was  an  ambitious  under-
taking by  the governments of our six  member countries, and 
it  was  achieved  by  compromises  more  often  politically  than 
economically  motivated.  These  political  realities  must  be 
recognized.  The  process  of  political  compromise  has  given 
Mr. Malve, European Communities' Representative for  Trade 
Affairs, was appointed to Washington  in September.  This arti-
cle lias  been adapted from his address in  Minneapolis on No-
vember 24 before the Agricultural Committee of the Chambers 
of Commerce of Minneapolis and St.  Paul and the  U.S.  De-
partment of Agriculture Club of the Twin Cities. 
our agricultural  commodities  higher  prtces  than  those on  th 
international  market, and we  in  the Community must, and de 
recognize it. 
On the other hand, you. in  the United States, should under 
stand our particular farming conditions.  Fifteen out of ever: 
hundred  workers  in  the  Community  are  still  on  the  land 
compared  with  four  out  of  a  hundred  in  the  United  State~ 
Our farmers' incomes are much lower than those in  other pro 
fessional  fields,  and  their  way  of  living  in  our  consume 
society  is  much  less  pleasant.  They  have  also  had  to  mak' 
large investments to modernize their farms. 
Thus,  price  increases  have  been  impossible  to  avoid 
Many of us  now admit the drawbacks of our system.  particu 
larly  because  for  the  most efficient  producers  prices  are  un 
justifiably high, while for the less productive farmers they afi 
not high enough. 
Prices  and  Production 
The  Community's  trading  partners  often  criticize  our  price 
policy  for  encouraging  over-production.  Fortunately,  this  i: 
not true for all  commodities: and, in  any case. it  is  difficult (( 
divide  the  responsibility  between  price  increases  and  th1 
growth  of  productivity.  Our  increase  in  grain  production 
for  instance,  is  mainly  due  to  overall  increases  in  produc 
tivity,  while  our  butter  and  skim  milk  surplus  is  mainly  < 
result of the high common  price level.  We in the Communit~ 
recognize  that  some of our intervention  price mechanisms-
our guaranteed prices-are too generous, encouraging farmer: 
to obtain the guaranteed prices rather than sell  to the market 
"Otha countries,  inc:ludinr.:  the  United  States,  also  have  costly  agricultural policies . ... Instead of fir.:hting  each  other,  the  United State At  a  time  when  there arc  fewer  and  fewer  export  markets 
and many other countries with  production surpluses, the Com-
munity must  find  ways to exrort  its  excess  production  as  well 
as  to  reduce  its  surpluses.  The costs of the  common  agricul-
tural policy have cono;iderahly  risen these past years and could 
at some point compromise the Community's goals.  (However. 
it  should he  mentioned  in  passing that other countries, includ-
ing the United States, also have costly agricultural  policies.) 
Some  Facts  and  Figures 
Despite  the  dittlculties  caused  by  the  stage-by-stage  develop-
ment of the common agricultural  policy.  it  has also had some 
positive  effects  in  expanding  international  trade,  especially 
American  exports  to  the  Community.  Our  total  agricultural 
imports have grown.  Even  our imports of products subject to 
variable  import  levies  have expanded. 
Our total  agricultural  imports  (excluding  intra-Community 
trade),  increased  from  $7.4 billion  in  195R  to  $R.9  billion  in 
1962,  and  to  $10.3  billion  in  1961-:i.  Of this  total,  imports  of 
products subject to common agricultural policy levies increased 
from $2.1  billion  in  195R  to $2.6 billion in  1962. and to $4.1 
billion in  1968. 
Imports  from  the  United  States  have  increased  consider-
ably.  Our  imports  of  total  U.S.  agricultural  products  went 
from $889 million in  1958 to $1.3 billion  in  1962, and to $1.6 
billion  in  1968. For U.S.  products subject to common agricul-
tural  policy  levies.  progress  has  been  still  more  spectacular: 
im?Orts  increased  from  $253  million  in  1958 to $549  million 
in  1962, and to $1.2 billion in  1968. 
Collllllllll!tv  must  combine their  efforts to soh•e  price problems." 
COMMUNITY  FARM  IMPORTS 
(in  billions uf dollars)  1958  1962  /966 
All  products'''  7.356  8.908  11.200 
Products subject to  levies  2.061  2.560  3.154 
From  United  States  .889  1.299  1.887 
From U.S.  subject to  Ievie~  .253  .549 
*excludes intra-Commwrity trade 
More importantly, the U.S. share of the Community's total 
imports increased more rapidly than any other country. Taking 
195R  as a  base year, the Community's imports of all  U.S.  agri-
cultural  products  had  risen  by  R4  per cent  by  1968,  but  the 
average increase was only 41  per cent for all  our other trading 
partners. 
Our  Market  Is  Not  Closed 
These  results  have  only  been  possible  because our market  is 
not  closed.  The  basic  tools  of  our  agricultural  policy  arc 
simple:  variable  levies  on  imports  and  tax  refunds  on  ex-
ports,  both  economically  neutral  in  their  effects  on  produc-
tion  and  trade.  Variable  levies  have  replaced  import  quotas. 
Thus,  entrance  into  the  Community  is  never  denied.  As  a 
result. the Community market is  never isolated from the world 
market  as  our  individual  member  countries·  markets  some-
times were before the common market. 
Furthermore.  by  setting  a  minimum  price  level  for  im-








ports,  the  Community  has  actually  improved  the  climate  for 
competition  between  the  exporting  countries.  For  instance. 
this  policy  has  prevented  sales  at  abnormally  low  prices, 
mainly  by  state  trading  countries.  The  common  prices  have 
sometimes  resulted  in  increased  export  profits  for  a  number 
of countries. 
Combined  Effort  Needed  to  Stabilize  Markets 
Instead of fighting each other. the United States and the Com-
munity  must  combine  their  efforts  to  solve  price  problems. 
I cannot overemphasize  that the  United States and the Com-
munity must cooperate. 
Every country  in  the world has an agricultural policy that 
varies  considerably  depending  on  the  product:  some  need 
great  protection  while  others  are  highly  competitive  on  the 
international  market.  The  United  States  itself  provides  such 
an example,  and  its  agricultural  policy  for grain  is  quite  dif-
ferent from its dairy policy. Most countries, without consulting 
each  other,  give  some  kind  of aid  to  their  agriculture,  even 
as  their  agricultural  policies  become  more  and  more  closely 
interdependent.  Unless  this  aid  and  this  interdependence  are 
taken into account, it seems practically impossible to solve the 
problems of production and international trade in  agricultural 
commodities. 
A  chance for international cooperation in  the field  of agri-
culture  was  lost  during the  Kennedy  Round  when  the  Com-
munity's proposal to negotiate the global  effect of government 
agricultural  aid  did  not receive  full  support. The Community 
was willing to freeze its common support prices for three years 
and  also  considered  the  possibility  of  making  commitments 
on self-sufficiency  ratios  for certain products.  I  am not going 
to accuse any one country of letting this chance for reciprocal 
and appropriate commitments slip by:  but,  when people criti-
cize  our  common  agricultural  policy,  they  often  forget  that 
the  Community did  make proposals  of great  significance  for 
the  future  of  international  agricultural  relations.  Instead  of 
becoming  discouraged,  we  should  seek  the  means  for  new 
cooperation. 
The  International  Grains Arrangement  is  a  good  example 
of  what  effective  cooperation  between  partners  can  accom-
plish.  After  meetings  in  London,  Washington,  and  Buenos 
Aires,  today  the  main  exporting  countries  have  reached  an 
agreement to avoid a price war which would hurt all  of them. 
In an ever-changing world, international agreements should 
provide a  supple framework  for  permanent consultation. The 
bilateral  contacts  which  tend  to  develop  between  politicians 
and officials  in  the United States  and  the  Community should 
improve their understanding of each other's different situations 
and points of view. 
Towards  Modern  Farming 
The Community has to make a  great effort to revise  its  price 
and market policy and has already started work on the reform 
of European agriculture. 
The Council  of Ministers  has  before  it  the  Mansholt Plan 
for reforming agricultural structures and for developing social 
aids.  This plan  means the Community recognizes that a  price 
policy by itself cannot solve every agricultural problem. It em-
phasizes  the  desire  to  speed  up  changes  in  agriculture  by 
favoring  large  units  of proJuction  and  granting premiums to 
older  farmers  to  encourage  them  to  give  up  farming.  Never 
before has  such  a  plan  been  so widely discussed  by all  of the 
people who would be affected by  it. 
The  Commission's  latest  proposals  on  prices.  production 
control  and  the  cost  of the  common  agricultural  policy  (see 
European Community No.  129,  paJ<e  17) include reducing the 
common  price  level  for  products,  such  as  wheat  and  dairy: 
limiting  price  guarantees  to  farmers,  and  establishing  some 
limits  for  the  trend  of expenditures  on  the common  agricul-
tural policy. 
These  measures  are  severe  because  farm  income  has  not 
increased during the past years.  In  fact,  allowing for  inflation 
and increases in  the prices of goods bought by farmers, Euro-
pean agricultural  prices have decreased in  real terms. Farmers 
would  be  unlikely  to  accept  such  stringent  price  restrictions 
without benefits that the Mansholt Plan would provide. 
Many  people  now  think  the  future  of  Europe  is  not  in 
agriculture  but  in  industry.  While  recognizing  the  need  to 
facilitate  transitions,  they  maintain  that  the  financial  burden 
of  agriculture  should  not  hold  back  industrial  development 
and economic expansion. 
Lively  Effort  for  Mutual  Understanding 
Both  the  Community  and  the  United  States  must  make  a 
lively effort to  improve mutual understanding and to find  ways 
for real cooperation. If  we  agree on these objectives, we should 
be  very  happy  to  have  the  meeting of U.S.  and  Community 
agricultural  organizations  in  Washington  in  the  early  1970's. 
Since  the  U.S.  and  Community  agricultural  situations  are 
different,  the  solutions  must  be  ditrerent.  This  fact  must  be 
understood and accepted. European farmers will  still need help 
in  the  next few  years in  their efforts  to adapt to the  require-
ments of the modern economy. 
Moreover, we  have to  try  not to  look at relations between 
the  Community and the  United States only from  the vantage 
point  of  agricultural  policy.  The  creation  of Europe  of  the 
Six favors the expansion of industrial trade, encourages Ameri-
can  investments  abroad,  and  contributes  greatly  to  the 
economy and the prosperity of the United States. Then. too, in 
the industrial field,  the Community's taritls are lower than the 
United States'. 
The Community customs area of the Six  may soon  include 
Great  Britain,  I rei and.  and  some  Scandinavian  countries. 
making  it  the  largest  importer as  well  as  exporter of goods. 
The United States and our other trading partners cannot fail 
to  benefit  from  this  enlargement,  since  the  strength  of  the 
Community economy, whether composed of six or more coun-
tries,  will  remain  a  significant  factor  in  the  future  trend  of 
world trade.  [Ed.  note:  A  study published in  early December 
by the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade indicated that 
Community trade, especially imports from other industrialized 
areas, gave the main impetus to world trade in  1968.] 
Most importantly, however, Europe of the Six  is  a  political 
endeavor,  with  political  goals  which  each  post-war  U.S. 
Administration has always supported. European political unifi-
cation, if it  comes into being in  a form still  to be defined, will 
have  greater  lasting  importance  than  the  elimination  of 
customs duties between six  small countries. The  Christmas Marathon 
- -------- ------
REGINALD DALE 
THE  PRE-CHRISTMAS  MARATHON  that  has  become  traditional 
with  the  European  Communities  Council  of  Ministers  set  a 
new  record  both  for  the length of a  single  negotiating session 
and for  the number of decisions it  produced. 
The  meeting  in  Brussels  opened  on  December  19  and  ad-
journed ncar dawn  on  December 22.  Major  issues  on  which 
agreement was  reached  included financing  the  common agri-
cultural  policy,  providing the Community with  its  own  finan-
cial  resources,  and strengthening the  budgetary powers of the 
European  Parliament. 
Significance of Agreements 
The decisions were important both for  the  Community's own 
future  and  for Britain  and  its  prospects  of Common  Market 
entry.  First,  by  agreeing  on  a  new  system  of  agricultural 
finance,  the  Five  met  the  major  French  prerequisite  for  the 
opening of negotiations.  Secondly,  the  broad outlines  of the 
system  to  which  Britain will  have to  adapt after entering the 
Community have now become clear. 
At  The  Hague summit  meeting,  the  French  had  solemnly 
undertaken not to  block the opening of negotiations with the 
United Kingdom  and  the other three  applicants for Commu-
nity  membership.  In  return,  Belgium,  Germany,  Italy,  Lux-
embourg,  and  the  Netherlands  said  they  would  agree  on  a 
new  regulation  to  finance  the  common  agricultural  policy  by 
December  31 ,  I 969.  Had  such  an  agreement  not  been 
reached  by  the  end  of  the  year,  the  timetable  set  at  The 
Hague would  have  been  jeopardized.  Now,  however,  France 
must keep  its  side  of the  bargain by  completing  preparation 
for negotiations by  the end of June and allowing formal  con-
tacts with Britain to begin soon after. 
The French interest in  the agricultural policy is  well  known. 
Throughout the history of the Community, the understanding 
has  been  that France gives  concessions  to  Germany  and  the 
Netherlands on  industrial  tariffs  in  return for concessions  by 
the other member states to French  agriculture.  France is  the 
chief beneficiary of the common agricultural  policy,  whereas 
Germany has  benefitted  most from the abolition of industrial 
customs barriers. 
The common  agricultural  policy  is  designed to  favor  farm 
exporting countries like France,  and  penalize  farm  importers 
like Italy-this is  the guarantee of the Community preference 
principle for  farm  products, so dear to  the French. For social 
and political  reasons, France is  determined to  protect the wel-
fare  of the  17  per  cent  of  its  population  dependent  on  the 
land;  the  conservative  agricultural  vote  has  been  one  of the 
most  important  political  props  of  the  French  Government 
ever since de Gaulle came to  power. 
With the former system of farm finance  expiring at the end 
of  1969, France sought an  open-ended commitment from  its 
partners  that  money  would  continue  to  be  available  for  the 
farm  pol icy,  however much  it  might  cost  in  the  future.  The 
French  also  asked  for,  and  received,  agreeement  from  the 
other  Five  that  the  new  system  that  had  to  he  set  up  be 
:hanged  only  by  unanimous  vote-effectively  giving  Paris  a 
veto over any modifications. 
'vir.  Dale is Common Market Correspondent of The Financial 
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Problems Ironed Out in  Marathon 
The  first  major  problem  that  had  to  he  sorted  out  in  nego-
tiations  for  the  finance  regulation  was  that  Germany,  Italy, 
Belgium,  and  the  Netherlands  all  thought  their current  pay-
ments  towards the  farm  policy  were  already too  high.  More-
over, under the Commission's  proposals, the cost to Germany, 
Italy, and the Netherlands would have risen further. 
The  second  problem  was  that  the  Netherlands  and  Italy 
were making their approval of the new  regulation conditional 
on  agreement  on  definite  steps  to  strengthen  the  European 
Parliament.  This  course  of  action  was  opposed  by  France, 
whose  policy  has  always  been  to  restrict  the  Parliament  to 
a  purely  consultative  role.  The  Commission  had  proposed 
that the  Six  should  progressively turn  over  all  their  revenue 
from  customs  duties  and  farm  import  levies  to  the common 
farm  fund,  and  that  any  extra  money  required  should  be 
raised  through  a  Community  tax  of  some  kind.  Under  the 
system  that  ended  at  the  end  of  1969,  the  Six  were  paying 
into the Fund 90 per cent of their agricultural levies,  none of 
their  customs  duties,  and  making up  the  rest  of the  money 
by  payments  out· of  their  national  budgets  according  to  a 
scale of fixed percentages. 
The proposed new system would mean a major loss of reve-
nue  for  national  budgets,  a  loss  proportionately  higher  for 
countries  with  a  high  level  of  industrial  imports-like  Ger-
many  and  the  Netherlands-or with  a  high  level  of agricul-
tural imports-like Italy. 
National Desires 
At the  beginning  of the  financial  negotiations  in  November, 
the  Dutch  maintained  that  they  could  never  agree  to  hand 
over all  their customs receipts into the common fund. If they 
accepted the Commission's proposal, they said, their share of 
the total cost of the farm policy would be almost 13  per cent, 
whereas  the  Netherlands  only  accounted  for  6.6  per  cent 
of  the  Community's  gross  national  product.  The  Italians 
were reluctant to pay in all their farm levies. 
France  supported  the  Commission's  proposals,  as  they 
would  have  led  to  the  automatic  creation  of  resources  to 
finance  the  farm  policy  ..  As  levies  and customs  duties  would 
go  straight into  the central  fund,  bypassing national  budgets, 
no  government could  in  the  future  threaten to  hold  back  its 
contribution  if  it  thought  the  farm  policy was  becoming  too 
expensive.  Equally  important,  the  acceptance  of  the  system 
by  the  Six  before  negotiations  opened  with  the  candidates 
would  mean  that Britain  would  have  little  alternative  but to 
follow suit. 
After the  summit conference,  it  became clear that  a  solu-
tion  on  these  lines  would  indeed  have  to  be  accepted.  The 
main issue then became the length and nature of a transitional 
period to allow countries like  the Netherlands to  adapt to the 
new  system.  However,  the  French  insisted  that  whatever 
arrangements be decided for customs duties, the farm levies, at 
least, must all be handed over immediately as they formed  an 
integral part of the common agricultural policy. 
The Compromise 
In  the  end,  France  secured  agreement  on  the  principles  it 
wanted,  though  it  was  forced  to  grant  various  concessions  17 18 
The Christmas marathon kept lights burning at the Commission's headquarters on the Rue de  Ia  Loi as  wr/1  as  111  the Council's headquarte1 
across town on the Rue Ravenstein. 
on  details.  The  French,  for  example,  gave  more  than  they 
would have liked on the Parliament, which will  now in  theory 
have the last word on the Community's budget instead of the 
Council. France will initially pay a higher share of the cost of 
the farm fund under the new system, and transitional measures 
will  continue longer than the French would have liked. 
Under the compromise system finally  adopted, the Six will 
from January I,  1971, pay all  their farm levies  and a part of 
their  customs  duties  into  the  fund.  The  scale  will  gradually 
increase so  that  100 per cent of both levies and duties will be 
paid  by  1975.  From  1971  to  1974,  inclusive,  the  deficit will 
continue to  be  made  up by  direct contributions according to 
the following  national  percentage scale:* 
Belgium  ......................................................  6.8 
Germany ....................................................  32.9 
France ........................................................  32.6 
Italy ............................................................  20.2 
Luxembourg  ..............................................  0.2 
Netherlands ................................................  7.3 
From 1975 on, the Six will finance  the deficit by turning over 
to  the  fund  a  fraction  of  their  receipts  from  the  common 
turnover  tax  on  the  value  added.  (Rates should  by  then  be 
roughly  harmonized  throughout  the  Community.) 
Nevertheless,  the  total  contributions _of  the  member  states 
will  continue  to  be  limited  under  a  moving  scale  that  will 
remain in  force until the end of 1977. For the one year, 1970, 
the  entire  farm  policy  will  be  financed  by  payments  from 
the  national  budgets  under a  new scale,  which  will  form  the 
basis for the moving scale over the following years. The 1970 
scale is as follows: 
Belgium  ................................................... . 
Germany ................................................ .. 
France ..................................................... . 
Italy ......................................................... . 
Luxembourg  ......................................... .. 







In  1971,  a  member state's  total  contribution can only  rise 
by  a proportion of I  per cent above this scale  (e.g. a  countr~ 
paying 20 per cent in  1970 could not be required to  pay mon 
than 20.2 per cent in  1971)  and so  on.  by steps of a  furthe 
1  per  cent  a  year  until  the  end  of  1974.  Countries  like 
France whose contributions will  fall  in  percentage terms car 
move downwards from the  1970 scale at a  maximum  rate o l 
1.5  per cent a  year up  to  the end of 1974. From 1975 to the 
end of  1977,  the  rate of adjustment becomes  2  per  cent  ir 
both  directions,  and  after January  1,  1978,  there  can  be  nc 
more such corrections at all. 
This  sort  of transition  period  may  well  resemble  the  ar· 
rangement  that  Britain will  have  to  accept when  it  joins  the 
Community.  All  six  countries,  including  France,  agree  tha1 
the  United  Kingdom,  with  its  high  duties and  levies,  will  be 
a  special  case.  However,  with  the  new  system  just  adopted 
forming the basis of the Six's negotiating position, Britain will 
almost  inevitably  have  to  pay  over  all  its  farm  levies  and 
customs duties in the long run. 
Nobody,  on  the  other  hand,  can  yet  predict  how  much 
money would be involved once  Britain has been in  the Com-
mon Market for  five  years  or  so.  British  customs  duties will 
fall  as  tariffs  are  abolished  on  Community  imports  and  the 
Kennedy  Round  comes  progressively  into  force.  The  level 
of farm  levies  will  depend on how far  Britain switches to  im-
porting farm  products from  other Community members,  how 
much  agricultural  production  rises  inside  Britain,  and  how 
far world prices rise.  (A rise  in  world food prices would  auto-
matically  reduce  the  amount of the  import  levies.)  All  that 
can  be  said  at  this  stage  is  that it  would  be  quite wrong to 
try to  estimate the cost on the basis of existing British import 
patterns. 
'''The  percentage  for  which  each  member country will  be  respon· 
sible  is  equal  to  the  arithmetical average of its share of ihe Com-
munity's  gross  national  product  and  the  mean  average  of  the 
budget scales set in  the  Rome Treaty. ED. After the Transition  Period 
:-<  DECEMBER  3 I,  1969,  the  transition  period  for  integration 
f  the  European  Economic  Community  (EEC)  ended  on 
:hedule. The 1958 Rome Treaty, which set the EEC in  motion, 
:quired the six member nations to create a full  customs union 
1d  to  link  together  their entire economies.  The designers  of 
te Treaty, however, feared that immediate realization of these 
Jals would seriously disrupt production and trade patterns. 
To minimize  possible dislocations,  the  Six  decided  to  reach 
teir  goals  in  three  four-year  stages.  The  Rome  Treaty thus 
rovided for a  12-year transition period  for fulfillment of the 
ommunity and  stipul~tted (Article 226)  that during the tran-
tion period a member state in economic difficulties could seek 
1thorization  to  take  safeguard  measures,  including  deroga-
Jn from Treaty provisions. 
During each of the three stages in  the transition period, the 
mge of issues on which the Treaty allowed the Council to de-
de by weighted majority vote, rather than by unanimous vote, 
as  widened.  After  the  end  of  the  transition  period  the 
rJ.animity  principle  will,  as  specified  in  the  Treaty,  continue 
, apply to: 
the extension  of common  transport policies to  sea  and air 
ansport  (Article 84) 
the  harmonization  of  turnover  taxes,  excise  duties,  and 
:her indirect taxes (Article 99) 
the  harmonization  of member  countries'  legislation  which 
1s  a  direct  incidence on  the establishment or functioning  of 
te Common Market (Article I 00) 
action necessary for the achievement of the Common Mar-
:t,  but not specifically  provided  for  in  the  Treaty  (Article 
~5) 
the admission of new members (Article 237) 
association  with  other countries,  unions of states,  or inter-
ttional organizations (Article 238). 
o  Extensions 
he  first  and  second  stages  could  have  been  prolonged,  but 
me of the member states requested such an extension. Thus, 
•.e  Community  passed  automatically  into  the  second  stage 
the beginning of 1962 and into the third stage at the begin-
ng of 1966. The third stage could be  prolonged up to  three 
!ars,  but  only  by  unanimous  decision  of  the  Council  of 
[inisters  voting  on a  proposal  of the  Commission. 
The  Commission  indicated  that  it  would  not  make  any 
.  ·oposal  to  this end, the Council  of Ministers concurred, and 
The  Hague  summit  the  six  member  governments  voiced 
>proval  of  this  decision.  The  Common  Market  was  to  be 
>mpleted  by  the  end  of  the  transition  period,  and  all  the 
)licies and rules envisaged by the Treaty were to be  in  force 
r then.  Many goals  will  have  been achieved  by  the end  of 
169,  and  the  members  plan  to  continue  their  work  in  the 
170's.  Completion of the  Community was  one  of the  main 
pies at The Hague summit. 
The  Six  have  already  achieved  a  viable  customs  union. 
~cept for  a  few  minor  agricultural  products,  quotas  and 
riffs have been dismantled for trade between them. Members 
LVe  unified  their  tariffs  on  industrial  imports  from  outside 
e  region  and  have  harmonized  their  treatment  of agricul-
ral  trade  with  non-members.  The  result  has  been  a  rapid 
pansion  of  trade  among  Community  countries.  Although 
trade  with  the  rest  of the  world  has  also  risen,  trade  among 
the Six  now  accounts  for  45  per cent of the  members'  total 
"exports," compared with 30 per cent in  1958. 
Another  significant  advance  towards  integration  has  been 
the  adoption  of  a  common  agricultural  policy-which  insti-
tuted  a  unified  and  jointly-financed  system  throughout  the 
Community,  with  support  buying  for  most  farm  produce  as 
well  as  joint financing  of agricultural export subsidies.  More-
over,  workers  in  any  of the  member countries  are  now  free 
to seek employment anywhere in  the Community on an equal 
basis with  local  workers. The Six  have also set  up  a  network 
of committees whose members meet often to consult on various 
aspects of monetary and fiscal policy. 
These accomplishments,  however,  are only partial progress 
t_oward  full  economic  integration.  National  monetary  and 
fiscal  policies are still set independently. Although a  common 
turnover tax system, the tax on value  added  (TVA),  is  now in 
force in  France, Germany, and the Netherlands, much remains 
to be done to complete the harmonization of tax systems; uni-
fication  of the rates of TVA  will  not come for some years.  On 
direct taxation, practically everything still  remains to be done. 
Positive  Integration 
As John Pinder, director of Political and Economic Planning, 
notes  on  page 22.,  the member states  have found  it easier  to 
integrate  "negatively"-removing  discriminatory  measures-
than "positively"-attempting to carry out economic and social 
policies  collectively-though it  can  be  argued  that the  Mar-
ket's common agricultural policy is  a good example of positive 
integration.  Mr. Pinder suggested a second  Rome Treaty that 
would provide for the formation of positive economic policies 
according  to  a  definite  timetable  and  with  them,  stronger 
Community institutions. 
Last  spring  the  Commission  drew  up  a  three-year  work 
program  outlining  necessary  action  by  the  Six  to  complete 
th<:  Common  Market  so  that  it  begins  to  resemble  a  single 
economic unit,  like the United States. The heads of state and 
government, meeting at The Hague, updated and added further 
specifics to this Community work program. 
The  common  agricultural  policy,  it  could  be  argued,  is  a  good 
example  of  "positive  integration,"  in  that  instead  of  rcmm·ing 
restrictions  on  trade  between  Community  members,  a  common, 
Community  policy  was substituted for  the  six  national policies  . 
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GOALS 
Abolish  customs  duties,  quantitative  restrictions,  and  other 
trade barriers. 
Establish  a  common  tariff  for  imports  from  non-member 
countries. 
Adopt  a  common  foreign-trade  policy,  involving  common 
trade  agreements  with  non-member  countries,  and  harmoni-
zation  of  import  systems,  national  export  assistance,  and 
insurance policies. 
Abolish restrictions on free  movement of people, on  right to 
establish  a  business  anywhere  in  the  Community,  and  on 
capital movements. 
Adopt a  common agricultural policy  providing for free trade 
in the Community, a unified internal market and price system 
for farm goods, and a  common system of external protection. 
Coordinate  economic  and  monetary  policies  through  con-
sultations and cooperation between member governments. 
PERFORMANCE 
All  customs  duties  and  quantitative  restnctwns  on  trade  in 
industrial  goods  within  the  Community  were  abolished  on 
July  1,  1968.  Other  non-tariff  barriers-such  as  varying 
national  safety  standards-remain,  but  are  scheduled  for 
elimination by  end-1970.  The Six are  now harmonizing their 
customs legislation. 
Tariffs on goods imported from non-member states were fully 
harmonized on July 1,  1968. 
Anti-dumping regulation adopted  April  1968.  Common rules 
for  agricultural  and  industrial  imports  from  non-member 
countries  (excluding  the  Communist  bloc)  agreed  to  in 
December  1968.  Bilateral  trade  accords  still  permitted,  on 
exceptional  basis,  till  January  1,  1973,  for  a  short  period. 
Progress  still  needed  on harmonizing export  policies  and on 
joint  action  on  discrimination  against  Community  goods  by 
non-member states. 
Free movement of workers  and their dependents  achieved  in 
July,  1968.  Various  Council  measures  completed  to  abolish 
restrictions on establishing businesses and providing services in 
agriculture,  forestry,  horticulture,  fishing;  mining  and  pros-
pecting;  gas,  electricity  and  water  industries;  manufacturing 
and trading; catering; cinema;  insurance. Work on facilitating 
access  to,  and  exercise  of,  other activities-notably the  pro-
fessions-is behind schedule owing to the complexity of work-
ing out equivalences in qualifications. 
Considerable  freedom  achieved  for  capital  movements,  espe-
cially  direct  investments.  Common  market  in  capital  stilt  at 
rudimentary stage. 
On  June  30,  1968,  remammg  tariffs  and  other  restrictiom 
abolished  on  trade  in  farm produce  among the Six.  The Si)! 
have  a  common  system  of variable  levies  to  protect  a  wide 
range  of domestic  foodstuffs,  and  a  Community agricultural 
fund  provides  a  common  mechanism  to  guarantee  suppor1 
prices of major products. The Six have still  to work out final 
farm-financing  arrangements, and recent French and German 
currency  moves  have  temporarily  restored  some  protective 
measures  within  the  Community.  Butter,  sugar,  and  grain 
surpluses-caused  by  high  prices-have  become  a  major 
source of concern, and the Commission has proposed a majm 
structural reform  of farming. 
The Six have established a number of consultative committees, 
but economic  policy  making remains  a  national  prerogative. 
The member states are now working on a plan to set up Com-
munity  machinery  to  provide  mutual  financial  assistance  to 
any member in  balance-of-payments difficulties. The plan pro-
vides for preliminary consultations with other members before 
a  country adopts  monetary or fiscal  policies  to  remedy  pay-
ments imbalances and for improved coordination of economic 
policies. GOALS 
Adopt a  common transport policy  which  eliminates discrimi-
nation in rates and harmonizes conditions of competition. 
Establish common rules preventing practices which distort or 
restrain  competition,  whether by  private  businesses  or mem-
ber governments 
Harmonize national legislation to the extent necessary for the 
functioning of the Common Market. 
Create a European Social Fund to help maintain full employ-
ment. 
Establish a  European Investment Bank to facilitate economic 
expansion  of  the  Community  and,  in  particular,  to  aid  its 
backward regions. 
Associate  overseas  territories  and  ex-territories  of  member 
states so as to  increase their trade and  to aid  their economic 
and social development. 
PERFORMANCE 
In July  1968  the Six  agreed  on  measures that:  prescribe con-
ditions of competition  for  road,  rail,  and  inland  water trans-
port;  introduce  Community  quotas  of  licences  for  intra-
Community  road-freight  traffic;  fix  allowances  for  duty-free 
fuel  in  truck  tanks;  harmonize  some  working  conditions  for 
truck and  bus drivers;  fix  floor  and ceiling  rates  for  frontier-
crossing road haulage. 
The Six  have  also  agreed  on  initial  steps  to  rationalize  rail-
ways' bookkeeping. Other aspects still to be dealt with include: 
varying  safety  standards  for  vehicles  and  pipelines,  infra-
structure  expenditure.  road  taxes,  measures  that  favor  the 
use of particular ports or means of transport, working condi-
tions in inland-water and rail transport. 
Definition  of unfair business  practices has been clarified  in  a 
body  of case  law,  and  the  Commission  has  imposed  heavy 
fines  on firms  operating cartels.  Competition  is  still  distorted 
by state aids  and monopolies  and  by  national public-procure-
ment policies. 
The Six  agreed  in  March  1969  to  adopt  directives  aligning 
their  legislation  on  technical  standards  for  industrial  goods 
and  food  by  January  1,  1971.  Four  members  adopted  by 
the  end  of  1969  the  common turnover  tax  system  on value 
added  (TVA).  Italy and Belgium have delayed its  introduction. 
The  unification  of  tax  rates  was  due  to  begin  in  the  early 
Seventies. 
In operation since  1960, the Fund spent $80 million between 
1960 and  1968  on retraining and resettling 960,000 workers. 
(Its contributions are matched by similar sums from the mem-
ber states.)  In  June  1969  the Commission  announced  exten-
sive  proposals  to  widen  the  Fund's  scope  and  increase  its 
budget. 
Between 1959, when it began functioning, and 1968, the Bank 
made  218  development loans  totalling  $1.13  billion,  a  large 
part of them  in  Southern Italy,  to help  finance  infrastructure 
projects and modernize industry. It has  also financed  projects 
in Greece, Turkey,  and  the  associated  African states. 
An  implementing  convention  annexed  to  the  Rome  Treaty 
associated these territories with the Community between 1958 
and 1962.  The first  five-year  Yaounde Convention,  signed  in 
July  1963,  established  a  new  type  of  relationship  with  18 
African states,  which had meanwhile become  independent.  It 
provided for the gradual freeing of trade between the Six and 
the Eighteen.  For the  five-year  period  1963-1968,  the  Com-
munity  allotted  $800  million,  mostly  in  direct  grants,  and 
partly in loans, for social and economic development through 
the  European  Development  Fund.  The  Convention  was  re-
newed for five  years in July  1969. and development resources 
increased to $1  billion.  21 22 
Is the Rome Treaty Biased Against 
JOHN  PINDER 
AS  LONG  AS  GENERAL  DE  GAULLE blocked the road  tO  full  ceo-
nomic  and  political  integration in  Western Europe, it  was too 
easy  to  assume  that his  departure would  open  up a  highway 
towards economic union free  from  agonizing crises  and  deci-
sions.  Beyond  the  roadblock,  however,  lies  some  virgin  terri-
tory and one or two  nasty chasms across which the highway 
must be built. 
The reason for this is  that the European Community's main 
thrust  has  been  towards  the  important  but  nevertheless  lim-
ited  objective  of  removing  distinctions  in  trade  and  other 
economic exchanges between  the member states,  not political 
integration.  Policies  that stand  a  strong chance of being  im-
plemented are those dealing with  what may  be called "nega-
tive  integration"-the  elimination  of  discrimination  between 
economic agents in the different member countries or the estab-
lishment  of  a  common  market  (the  elimination  of  customs 
duties  and  quotas,  and  the  adoption  of  a  common  customs 
tariff.) 
The policies with a weaker chance are those concerned with 
"positive  integration "-a {;Ollective  attempt  by  the  member 
countries  to  maximize  welfare  in  the  customs  union,  or the 
establishment of an economic union. Free trade is  firmly  built 
into  the  system;  but  the  positive  and  modern  common  eco-
nomic policies that will  improve the welfare of the people by 
promoting  regional  growth,  minimizing  unemployment,  and 
meeting  the  American  challenge  with  a  forceful  federal  pro-
gram  for  European science  and  technology,  for example,  are 
still little more than a possibility for the future. This situation 
has four main causes. 
First,  almost  everyone  concerned  with  the  foundation  of 
the Community agreed that  they were inaugurating a new era 
for Europe in which war between the member countries would 
become  unthinkable  and  that they should,  as  far as  possible, 
cease  to  discriminate  against citizens  of other member coun-
tries  as  foreigners.  Non-discrimination  has  become  a  deep-
rooted reflex  among those who run the Communities. 
Second,  it is  not difficult to  provide in  a  treaty for the  re-
moval of discrimination,  a  concept relatively simple to  define 
and  to  enforce.  It is  much  harder  to  ensure  by  means  of  a 
treaty the formation of an effective common policy.  A  policy 
might  take any one of a  thousand  forms,  and  it wiii  usually 
be  hard to  attribute to  any  individual  or government the  re-
sponsibility  for  failure  to  define  a  common policy,  still  more 
an  effective  one.  In short,  a treaty can more easily effect  the 
"thou shalt not" commandments than  the  "thou shalt"  ones. 
Third,  the  nco-liberals  who  were  for  many  years  in  sole 
control of the German  Government adhered  to  an  economic 
ideology that stressed free trade and circumscribed the role of 
economic  policy.  Dr.  Ludwig  Erhard,  in  particular,  opposed 
the  idea that Brussels should become a  policy-making power-
house.  Given the importance of Germany among the Six,  the 
extent of common policy-making was  severely limited. 
The expamion of trade in  household appliances  between  France  and Italy  provides a strikint-:  example of the success of "negative integra-
tion," in this case, the lowering of tariffs and the remm,al of quotas. :ommon Policies? 
Resistance  to  Losing  Power 
Fourth, there is  a  natural tendency for national  bureaucracies 
and government machines to  resist any loss  of their power of 
unilateral  decision  and  action,  which  an  effective  procedure 
for  making decisions  in  common  implies.  Only  by  the  relin-
quishment of power are  common  or coordinated  policies  on 
the complex issues of positive integration likely to  be brought 
about.  All  these  factors  influenced  the  content of the  Rome 
Treaty,  which is  therefore  in  its  detail  strongly  biased  in  the 
direction  of  negative  integration  and  away  from  positive 
integration. 
This is  illustrated in  Article 3 of the Treaty which outlines 
the  activities  of the  Community,  as  well  as  in  later  articles 
where some details are filled  in.  Article 3 speaks of "the elim-
ination,  as  between  member states, of customs duties  and of 
quantitative restrictions ... as  well  as of other measures with 
equivalent  effect"  and  "the establishment  of a  common  cus-
toms  tariff."  These  precise  objectives  are  elaborated  in  sub-
sequent articles. 
Then there  is  "the abolition  as  between  member states,  of 
the obstacles  to  the free  movement of persons,  services,  and 
capital" and "the establishment of a system ensuring that com-
petition shall not be distorted in  the Common Market," equally 
unequivocal  objectives  of  negative  integration.  These,  how-
ever,  are  more  complicated  to  carry  out  than  the  establish-
ment of the customs union and, therefore, less precisely spelled 
out later in the Treaty. 
Article  3  also  specifies  a  common  commercial  policy,  a 
common agricultural  policy,  and a  common transport policy. 
These sound definite  enough,  but  it  remains  much easier for 
the member governments to default on their obligation to form 
an undefined common policy than it is  for them to evade their 
promises to remove discrimination and distortions. 
When Article  3  broaches such  crucial elements of positive 
integration  as  economic  policies  and  balance-of-payments 
problems,  it  becomes extremely vague and  permissive instead 
of definite  and  mandatory. It merely  speaks  of "the applica-
tion  of procedures which shall  make it  possible to  coordinate 
the  economic  policies  of member  states  and  to  remedy  dis-
equilibria in  their balances of payments." In the body of the 
Treaty,  there  is  only  one  article,  and  a  feeble  one  at  that, 
dealing with "policy relating to economic trends." Six  articles 
deal  with  balance-of-payments  problems,  compared  with  29 
on the establishment of the customs union. 
The  remaining  items  listed  in  Article  3  are  the  "approxi-
mation  of laws"  which  mainly  involves  the  removal  of dis-
criminatory  provisions  from  national  laws  that  distort  com-
petition;  the creation of the Social  Fund and the Investment 
Bank,  which  are  certainly  elements  of economic  union  but 
which,  with  their  current  resources,  can  have  only  a  small 
influence;  and the association of overseas countries and terri-
tories. 
Mr.  Pinder is director of Political and Economic Planning,  a 
British policy research organization. This article is based on his 
contribution to  Economic Integration  in  Europe, a collection 
of essays scheduled for  publication in the United Kingdom by 
Weidenfeld and Nicolson. 
Political  Bargain 
Article  3  accurately reflects  the Treaty's emphasis on the re-
moval of discrimination  and distortions,  i.e., on negative  inte-
gration and the consequent establishment of a common market. 
Article 4  refers to the Community's institutions:  Assembly, 
Council,  Commission,  and  Court,  which  constitute  the other 
main  concrete  achievement  of the  Treaty  itself. 
In an age  when  all  governments of modern states use eco-
nomic  policies  for  many  purposes  beyond  the  minimal,  neo-
liberal one of removing distortions from the economic system, 
it  is  quite  inconsistent  for  the  Community  to  confine  itself 
largely to this negative task. Indeed, it will  probably be found 
that  the  free  trade  system  cannot be  indefinitely  maintained 
unless  the  Community undertakes many of the positive  tasks 
that modem citizens  demand,  and  that  national  governments 
may  not be  able to perform when  they belong to  a  common 
market.  A  ''second  Rome Treaty" will  probably be  required, 
embodying a  firm commitment to move forward to economic 
union:  providing for the formation of a  whole range of posi-
tive  economic  policies  according  to  a  definite  timetable  and 
for  the  stronger  and  more  democratic-and  thus  federal-
institutions that will  be required to accomplish these policies. 
COMMON  MARKET  TREATY,  ARTICLE  3 
For  the  purposes  set  out  in  the  preceding  article,  the 
activities of the Community shall include, under the con-
ditions and with the timing provided for in  this Treaty: 
(a)  the elimination,  as  between  member states,  of cus-
toms duties and of quantitative restrictions in regard to 
the importation and exportation of goods, as  well  as  of 
all  other measures with  equivalent effect 
(b) the establishment of a common customs tariff and a 
common commercial policy  towards  third  countries 
(c)  the abolition,  as  between member states,  of the ob-
stacles  to  the  free  movement  of persons,  services  and 
capital 
(d)  the  inauguration of a  common  agricultural  policy 
(e)  the inauguration of a  common transport policy 
(f) the establishment of a system ensuring that competi-
tion shall not be distorted in  the Common Market 
(g) the application of procedures which shall make it pos-
sible  to  coordinate  the  economic  policies  of  member 
states  and  to  remedy  disequilibria  in  their balances  of 
payments 
(h) the approximation of their respective municipal law 
to the extent necessary for the functioning of the Com-
mon Market 
(i) the creation  of a  European Social  Fund in order to 
improve the possibilities of employment for workers and 
to  contribute  to  the  raising  of their standard of living 
(j) the establishment of a European Investment Bank in-
tended to facilitate the economic expansion of the Com-
munity through the creation of new  resources and 
(k)  the  association  of overseas  countries  and  territories 
with the Community with a view to  increasing trade and 
to  pursuing  jointly  their  effort  towards  economic  and 
social development. 
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COMMUNITY  NEWS 
1970  PROMISES  FURTHER  RAPID  ECONOMIC GROWTH 
Nineteen  seventy  will  be  another  year  of 
rapid  economic  growth  for  the  European 
Community,  but  a  little  less  rapid  than 
1969,  a  boom  year,  according  to  the  Euro-
pean Communities Commission. 
This  forecast  was  made  in  the  Commis-
sion's third  and  last  report on the economic 
situation  in  1969  which  also  contains  a  re-
view  of  the  major  economic  events  of  the 
year. 
Gross  Community  product,  adjusted  for 
cost  increases,  rose  by  7  per  cent  in  1969, 
compared  with  6  per  cent  in  1968.  The 
Commission  estimated  the growth  of  Com-
munity  GNP  at  4.5  per  cent  in  1970.  Since 
the  Community  began  to  function  in  1958, 
its  economy  has  expanded  by  85  per  cent, 
compared  with  increases  of  63  per  cent in 
the  United  States  and  41  per  cent  in  the 
United  Kingdom. 
This  expansion  was  not  entirely  without 
difficulties.  A  marked deterioration occurred 
in  prices. upsetting trade and  payments rela-
tions  between  Community  members.  As  a 
result,  France  devalued  the  franc  by  11.11 
per  cent  on  August  10,  and  Germany  re-
valued the mark by 9.29 per cent on October 
27. 
Export  Demand Strong 
Throughout  1969  overall  demand  expanded 
very  rapidly.  However,  towards  the  end  of 
the  year,  export  demand.  particularly  from 
the United States  and  the United  Kingdom, 
showed  signs  of a  distinct  slowdown.  Total 
growth of Community  exports  during  1970 
is  estimated at 11  per cent. 
Consumption expenditure, both public and 
private, grew during the year. Salaries in  the 
public  sector  rose,  and  private  household 
spending  increased  sharply  (11.5  per  cent) 
as  a  result  of  the  rapid  rise  in  disposable 
income and,  in  some countries,  a  decline  in 
the  rate of personal  savings.  Despite  the  12 
per cent growth of production during  1969, 
a  shortage of labor towards  the  end  of the 
year and  pressure  on  plant  capacity  caused 
a large increase in  the already heavy backlog 
of orders. 
Prices and Imports Rose 
As  a result of these factors,  prices of capital 
goods  rose  nearly  100  per cent  faster  than 
in  1968  while  the  rate of price increase for 
consumer  goods  rose  by  50  per  cent.  Im-
ports  also  rose,  by  17  per  cent,  and  trade 
between  Community  members  grew  by  al-
most  a  third,  the highest  rate of increase in 
the Community's existence. 
The Community's  $1.7  billion  surplus  on 
visible  trade  with  non-member  countries 
turned into  a  deficit by  the end  of the  year. 
Long-term capital movements also showed a 
heavy  deficit.  Until  the  revaluation  of  the 
German mark, there had been  large inflows 
of  short-term  funds  into  the  Community, 
but  a  large  part  left  the  country  after  the 
change of parity. 
Official  gold  and  foreign  exchange  hold-
ings  of  the  member  governments,  after  a 
$1.8  billion decrease in 1968,  had risen $2.5 
billion by the end of September. By  October, 
however,  they again fell  sharply. 
Domestic demand inmost member countries 
SPIRIT  OF  SUMMIT REVIVES  EURATOM 
The Six  agreed  at a  meeting of the Council 
of  Ministers  on  December  6  to  reorganize 
the  European  Atomic  Energy  Community 
(Euratom)  so  that  it  can  do  nuclear  re-
search under contract  and  extend  its  activi-
ties  to  non-nuclear  scientific  research,  es-
pecially  joint  projects  with  other  European 
states.  Both  proposals  were  originally  made 
by  the Commission. 
Discussion  of the fate of Euratom's Joint 
Research Center  and  multi-annual  Research 
and  Development  Program  had  been  going 
on  for  more  than  three  years,  and  a  de-
cision  had  already  been  made  to  cut  back 
the  number  of  research  personnel.  The 
Council's decision on  December 6,  however, 
guaranteed  the maintenance of the research 
staff  and  budget at the  current level  and  set 
a  two-year  deadline  for  the  reorganization 
of the Center's management. 
Goal: Efficiency and Flexibility 
Management  will  be  reorganized  so  as  to 
improve  coordination  of  the  Community 
members'  nuclear  actiVIties  and  increase  its 
flexibility  in  preparing  and  executing  Eura-
tom's joint research  program. Until  comple-
tion of this  reorganization,  the  current  size 
of both the budget and the staff of the Joint 
Research  Center  will  be  maintained.  Eura-
tom's  1969 research program will  be carried 
over into  1970  and,  if necessary,  into  1971, 
with  the  understanding  that  beginning  with 
1970  it  must  help  to  promote  broad  Euro-
pean  cooperation  on  advanced  reactor  re-
search,  especially  fast  breeders. 
The change in  Euratom's fortunes  reflects 
the  improved  atmosphere  in  the  Six  since 
The Hague summit.  The Council  resolution 
stated  that  the  ministers  had  been  inspired 
by  the  agreement  reached  at The Hague. 
In  working  out  the  third  long-term  pro-
gram,  the  Council  said  it  would  make  the 
initial  decisions  on  cooperation  in  the  field 
of advanced reactors and examine the Com-
mission's  proposal  for  building  an  isotopic 
separation plant in Europe to ensure a long-
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should  continue to  fuel  economic growth in 
1970. The pace of world business will  prob-
ably  slow  this,  so  that  the  Community's 
imports from non-member countries in  1970 
will  not grow as  fast as  in  1969. 
Given  the  large order backlog  at  the end 
of  1969,  investment  in  capital  goods  will 
continue  to  rise  vigorously  early  this  year, 
but  may  weaken  later.  Private  consumer 
expenditure  should  maintain  its  rapid 
growth,  since  personal  incomes  are  likely 
to go on rising. 
However,  shortages  of  both  manpower 
and  plant  capacity  will  restrain  the  growth 
of production.  As  a  result,  prices  are likely 
to  continue  increasing,  and  rising  imports 
will  widen  the  Community's  trade  deficit. 
TVA  DELAY  AUTHORIZED 
FOR  BELGIUM  AND  ITALY 
Italy  and  Belgium  were  authorized  by  the 
European  Communities  Council  of  Minis-
ters, on December 9,  to delay until  January 
1,  1972,  the  introduction  of  the  common 
turnover  tax  on  value  added.  According  to 
the  original  timetable,  all  six  Community 
members  should  have  adopted  the  TVA  by 
the  end  of  1969. 
In exchange for  this  extension,  Italy  and 
Belgium  agreed  not  to  increase  the  average 
rates that were in  effect on October  I, 1969, 
for  calculating  charges  on  imports  and  re-
funds  of  internal  taxes  paid  on  exports. 
They agreed  to reduce these rates beginning 
on April  1,  1970. 
In  addition,  the  Council  asked  the  Com-
mission  to submit proposals  as  soon  as  pos-
sible indicating how and  when the harmoni-
zation  of  turnover  tax  rates  will  allow  the 
members of the  Community  to  abolish  im-
port  taxes  and  export  rebates  on  trade  be-
tween them. The Council also acknowledged 
the need to extend the  application of TVA to 
the  retail  trade  and  to keep  the  number of 
tax rates to the minimum. NEW  BID  MADE  FOR 
COMMON  MARKET  IN 
BRANDED  DRUGS 
The Six  by January  1,  1974,  should achieve 
a  common market  in  the  more  than  25,000 
brand  products  known  as  "pharmaceutical 
specialties,"  according  to  a  proposal  made 
in  October  by  the  European  Communi-
ties  Commission.  Such  patent  medicines 
account  for  more  than  four-fifths  of  the 
Community's  medicine  market. 
The  Commission  asked  the  Council  of 
Ministers  to  decide  on this  proposal  before 
the end of the year. The Commission pointed 
out  that  many  patent  medicines  are  ad-
mitted  to  only one national market,  making 
them  unavailable  to  other  patients  in  the 
Community. 
"It cannot be  tolerated  that  a  continually 
expanding branch of industry should remain 
cut off  for  an  unforeseeable  time  from  the 
advantages of a free market within the Com-
munity,"  the  Commission  said.  Neither 
should consumers of pharmaceuticals be de-
prived  of  the  widest  choice  and  cheapest 
possible  source  of  best-quality  drugs. 
The Commission  said  it  intended  to  open 
legal  p,oceedings  against  member  states 
under  Article  169  of  the  Rome  Treaty  if 
they  continued  in  their  failure  to  take 
action  in  this  sphere.  Community  institu-
tions have been working on the problem for 
the  past  seven  years,  making  it  now  pos-
sible  "to  find  a  balanced,  comprehensive 
solution  that takes  account of all  legitimate 
interests." The Commission has drawn up  a 
timetable  for  the  gradual  realization  of  a 
common market for  drugs by the beginning 
of 1974. 
U.S.  MISSION  OFFERS 
3  RESEARCH  SCHOLARSHIPS 
The United States  Mission  to  the  European 
Communities  in  Brussels  is  giving  three 
scholarships  for  research  on  relations  be-
tween  the  United  States  and  Europe.  Each 
scholarship  is  worth  $2,000  for  10-12 
months. 
The  scholarships  are  intended  for  young 
European  postgraduate  researchers,  teach-
ing  assistants,  young  lecturers,  or  profes-
sors  who  are  working  on  European  ques-
tions in European institutes, research centers, 
or  universities. 
Interested  candidates  should  send  re-
quests  for  further  information  to  the  Gen-
eral  Secretary,  European  Community  Insti-
tute  for  University  Studies,  200  rue  de  Ia 
Loi  (Bat.  Berlaimont  2/80),  Bruxelles  4, 
Belgium. 
Applications  should  be  sent  in  before 
February 28,  1970. 
NUMBER  OF  TELEPHONES TO  TRIPLE  BY  1985 
The  number  of  telephones  installed  in  the  ' 
six  European Community countries is  likely 
to increase from  17.9  million  in  1969  to  56 
million  by  1985,  representing  an  investment 
expenditure of some $40 billion. 
This  forecast  was  made  in  a  study  done 
for  the  Common  Market  Commission  by 
the Federation of Telecommunications Engi-
neers of the European Community (FTEEC). 
Even  in  1985  the  network  density  in  the 
Community will  only  equal  that reached  in 
1967  by  countries  such  as  Switzerland  and 
New Zealand,  and  greatly  exceeded  by  the 
United  States  and  Sweden. 
Telephones  Telephones pu 
(millions)  100 inhabitants 
1969  1985  1969  1985 
----
Germany .......  7.3  21.0  12.2  31.1 
Belgium  ···-···  1.27  2.7  13.2  25.8 
France ..........  3.68  15.5  7.2  25.5 
Italy  ------------·  5.58  17.0  10.36  28.7 
Luxembourg  0.07  0.15  21.8  42.5 
TOTAL*  ········ 17.90  56.35  10.0  28.6 
*The Netherlands does not belong to the Federation. 
During the 1969-85 period, inter-city calls 
should  increase  fivefold,  and  international 
EUROPE GIVES  U.S. ONE YEAR 
MORE  TO  REPEAL  ASP 
Once  again  the  European  Community  has 
agreed  to  an  extension  of the  deadline  for 
fulfilling a special agreement with the United 
States  cutting  tariffs  on  chemical  products. 
Negotiated  as  a  separate,  supplementary 
agreement  to  the  Kennedy  Round  of  tariff 
negotiations,  the  bargain  provided  for  fur-
ther cuts in  chemical tariffs  and other trade 
concessions  by  Europe  if  the  United  States 
removed  the  American-selling-price  (ASP) 
system of customs evaluation. 
The  decision  was  reached  by  the  Com-
munity  at  its  December  19-22  Council  of 
Ministers  meeting,  in  Brussels,  following 
consultations with the other General Agree-
ment on Tariffs  and Trade  (GATT)  partners 
concerned,  in Geneva on December  12.  Be-
sides  the  European  Community  and  the 
United States,  Britain  and  Switzerland  were 
also  party to the agreement. 
The  original  agreement  gave  the  United 
States until  the  end  of  1968  to  abolish  ASP 
if  its  provisions  were  to  come  into  force. 
A  one-year  extension  was  given  at  the  end 
of 1968  and  again in  1969 because the U.S. 
Congress had not yet  abolished  the system, 
which  applies  mainly  to  benzenoid  chemi-
cals.  The  delay  in  fulfilling  the  chemicals 
agreement  would  not  affect  the  third  stage 
of Kennedy  Round  tariff  cuts  in other sec-
tors,  which  were  to  be  made  on  January 
I,  1970. 
Direct dialing,  improved equipment, and in-
vestments  of  $40  billion  between  now  and 
1985  should  cause  a  swift  increase  in  both 
domestic and international phone calls. 
calls  will  develop  even more quickly.  Telex 
systems  will  also  proliferate.  However,  the 
experts consider that, in general, the amorti-
zation  period  for  existing  telecommunica-
tions equipment will slow down development 
of new techniques, such as  data teleprocess-
ing and videophone. 
EUROPE'S  AUTO  UNIONS 
SEEK  UNIFORM CONDITIONS 
Union  leaders  representing  automotive  in-
dustry workers from  14  European countries 
last month agreed  on a  new policy of close 
cooperation  to  narrow  differentials  between 
wages  paid in  different countries and to pro-
tect  each  other  when  necessary  during 
strikes. 
Meeting  in  Paris  December 3-5  at  a  con-
ference,  the  first  of  its  kind,  organized  by 
the  International  Metal  Workers'  Federa-
tion,  the  delegates  expressed  concern  with 
the growing concentration of the automotive 
industry in a few  hands and the high degree 
of  American  penetration  of  the  market. 
The car workers  plan  to  develop  concerted 
union  action  on the  European level  to  iron 
out  present  inequalities  in  pay  and  condi-
tions and extend democracy to the shop floor. 
Union  leaders  studied  wage  rates  and 
earnings  paid  by  automotive  manufacturers 
to  their  employees  in  different  countries. 
They  will  try  to  ensure  that,  for  instance. 
Ford workers all over Europe earn the same 
in  relation  to  their countries'  cost  of living 
levels.  The  object,  apart  from  improving 
wages,  is  to  ensure  that  international  com-
panies do not run down plants in  one coun-
try  and  build  up plants  in  a  cheaper  labor 
market.  The  unions  also  agreed  that  they 
would  try  to  stop companies  from  transfer-
ring  work  from  one  country  to  another 
during  strikes.  25 26 
MONNET GROUP SETS  THREE  ENTRY  TALK  PRIORITIES 
The  European  Community's  negotiations 
with Britain  and  other candidates for mem-
bership  should  at  first  be  limited  to  essen-
tials,  and all  other questions should be dealt 
with  after  the  candidates  become  members, 
according to Jean Monnet's Action Commit-
tee for the United States of Europe. 
At a meeting in  Bonn on December 15-16, 
the  Committee said  there  were  three essen-
tial problems to be solved in connection with 
British membership: 
•  British  participation  in  the  institutions  of 
the  Community.  The  Committee  felt  that 
Britain must have the  same rights  and obli-
gations as  other member states and the same 
share in the institutions as  countries of com-
parable population. 
•  the  length  of  the  transition  period  for 
agriculture and for alignment with the com-
mon tariff 
•  Britain's  share  in  the  Community's  agri-
cultural  financing,  which  should  be  settled 
SIX  AGREE  ON  COMMON 
EAST  BLOC  TRADE  RULES 
The  Six  agreed,  on  December  16,  on  a 
common  import  system  for  trade  with  the 
Soviet  Union  and  Eastern  Europe  and  on 
common  rules  for  exports.  Under  this  sys-
tem,  which went into force immediately, no 
member  state  may  unilaterally  re-impose 
quotas or trade restrictions  on products ap-
pearing on the new Community "liberaliza-
tion  lists." 
The lists specify the products now allowed 
to  enter  all  six  member  states  on  a  quota-
free  basis.  For  the  five  East  European 
countries-Poland,  Czechoslovakia,  Hun-
gary,  Rumania,  and  Bulgaria-each  list 
comprises about 400 products. For the Soviet 
Union,  however,  the  Community's  list  in-
cludes  only  about  40  tariff  positions.  This 
is because the Federal Republic of Germany 
has  no trade  agreement  with  the ussR,  and 
has liberalized only this  number of Russian 
products. The Community's lists include only 
products liberalized by all six member states. 
The  Commission  will  now  try  to  add 
other  products  to  the  liberalization  lists. 
Products  can  only  be  removed  from  the 
lists  by  a  decision  of the  Community  as  a 
whole,  although governments  can introduce 
short-term  safeguards  if  their  markets  are 
seriously distorted by East Bloc imports. 
Under  the  common  rules  for  exports  to 
all  non-member countries,  no  member state 
may  henceforth  unilaterally  forbid  the  ex-
port of any new product that is  not already 
restricted. The Council endorsed a  short list 
of all the products on which restrictions now 
exist. 
between  Britain  and  the  Six  rather  than 
presented as  a  fait accompli from a formula 
worked out by the Six  alone. 
The  Committee  stressed  the  urgent  need 
to coordinate the Community countries' eco-
nomic  policies  and  recommended  further 
work  towards  the establishment of  a  Euro-
pean  reserve  fund,  a  gradual move  towards 
economic  and  monetary union,  and  reform 
of the European Social Fund. 
On political integration, the Monnet Com-
mittee decided  to  conduct  a  detailed review 
at its  next meeting,  in six  months. 
"Hope and Practicality" 
The British Foreign Secretary Michael Stew-
art  said  the  resolution  "contains  a  proper 
mixture of good hope and practicality." 
German Chancellor Willy Brandt lent sup-
port to  the  resolution,  as  did  Italian,  Bene-
lux,  and  French  political  leaders;  however 
no  member  of  the  French  Government  or 
JOBLESS  MIGRANTS TO GET 
UNIFORM BENEFITS 
The Council  of Ministers  on  November  25 
agreed  on  two  new  social  security  regula-
tions  for  migrant  workers  in  the  Commu-
nity. The measures will mainly benefit Italy, 
which  provides  about  80  percent  of  the 
Six's  migrant labor force. 
•  The  Six  agreed  on  a  uniform  system  of 
unemployment  benefits  for  workers  who 
become  jobless  in  Community  countries 
other than their own.  If they  cannot find  a 
new  job  within  four  weeks,  these  workers 
will  be  entitled to move to another country 
or return home and continue to receive  full 
unemployment  benefits  for  the  next  three 
months  from  the  country  where  they 
worked. 
•  Workers  who  leave their families  behind 
when  they  migrate  to  another  Commu-
nity  country  will  receive  family  allowance 
payments  from  the  government  of  the 
country  where  they  work.  A  temporary 
exception from  this  rule has  been made for 
France, which pays out much higher family 
allowances  than  the  other  member  states. 
However, the French agreed that" a  uniform 
Community  system  should  be  worked  out 
before  the  beginning  of  1973. 
The ministers  set  mid-March  as  the  date 
for  the  "tripartite"  conference  on  Commu-
nity labor problems. First proposed over two 
years  ago,  the  conference  will  bring  to-
gether  ministers  of labor,  the  Commission, 
and  representatives  of  labor  unions  and 
management associations. The main Commu-
nist  trade unions will  be invited. 
the  Gaullist  party  took  part  in  the  discus-
sions. 
Mr.  Monnet  said  that  the  recommenda-
tions  sought  to  define  how  the  decisions 
taken  at  The  Hague  summit  should  be 
applied. 
On the  opening  day  Mr.  Brandt declared 
that The Hague summit had  opened  a  new 
perspective  for  the  European  Community. 
He  said  he  had  gone  to  The  Hague  de-
termined  that  the  Six  should  be  ready  to 
open negotiations with Britain by the end of 
the  spring-June  21.  The  Hague  meeting 
had set  a deadline of June 30,  so there was 
therefore no great difference. 
Much of the first  day's session  was  taken 
up  with  a  report  from  Robert  Triffin  of 
Yale University on  his  plan for a  European 
reserve  fund  into  which  European  central 
banks  would  deposit  part of their  reserves. 
Such  a  fund  could  provide  a  means  of 
stabilizing  exchange  rates  pending  the  crea-
tion of a  common European currency. 
COOPERATIVE  RESEARCH: 
UNITED  KINGDOM  ACCEPTS 
COMMUNITY  INVITATION 
Britain on November 18  accepted an invita-
tion  from  the  Six  to  begin  talks  on  tech-
nological  cooperation  on  a  Europe-wide 
basis.  The  British  Government  said  it  was 
ready  to  start  discussing  details  of  specific 
projects outlined by the Six. 
The  Commission  has  invited  nine  other 
European  countries  to  collaborate  with  the 
Six  in  fields  ranging  from  computers  to 
meteorology.  Norway,  Switzerland,  Irehmd, 
Austria,  Sweden,  Denmark,  and Spain  have 
also  accepted  the  invitation.  Portugal's  an-
swer is  still  awaited. 
The  invitations  were  accompanied  by 
copies of the Community's "Aigrain Report" 
on  technological  cooperation.  The  report 
proposes  about  30  specific  projects  for  co-
operation  under  seven  general  headings-
data-processing,  telecommunications,  metal-
lurgy,  means  of  transport,  oceanography, 
meteorology,  and environmental control. 
TRADE  PACT  WITH  IRAN 
EXTENDED  FOR ONE YEAR 
The trade agreement between the European 
Economic Community and Iran was renewed 
for  one  year,  from  December  1,  1969,  by 
an exchange of letters on November 28. 
The agreement was signed on October 14, 
1963.  It was  amended  by  an  exchange  of 
letters on November  8,  1967,  and  renewed, 
also by an exchange of letters, on November 
26,  1968. CD  1970 Ralph V. Robinson 
TEENAGERS  MORE  PRO- EUROPEAN  THAN  THEIR  PARENTS 
A  pro-European  bias  among  parents  is 
usually  magnified  in  their teenage  offspring, 
according  to  a  poll  conducted  by  Ronald 
Inglehart,  professor  of  political  science  at 
the  University  of  Michigan,  Ann  Arbor. 
Professor  Inglehart  interviewed  a  repre-
sentative  sampling  of 2,000  British,  French, 
and  German  children  between  15  and  20 
years  old  and  their  parents.  He  asked  four 
questions: 
•  If a United States of Europe were created 
now,  should  your country join? 
Percentage Favorable 
GERMAN 
teenagers  -········-···----·--········-···-···················  92 
parents  ··-·················-·································  71 
FRENCH 
teenagers  ····--··············································  83 
parents  ············-·······--········-··-····················  65 
BRITISH 
teenagers  ....................................................  7  6 
parents  ··-····-·----·················-·······-·········-·····  31 
MOST  BRITISH  INDUSTRIES WOULD  GAIN  FROM  ENTRY 
Major  British  industries  would  gain  from 
membership  in  the  European  Community, 
according  to  "The  Balance  Sheet  of  the 
Common  Market,"  a  pamphlet  published 
last  month  by  the  Institute  of  Directors. It 
says that only  a few sectors appear likely to 
suffer  adverse  consequences. 
"Gainers"  would  probably  be  industries 
with  a  high  capital  to  output  ratio,  where 
relative  efficiency  compares  favorably  with 
the  average  of  Western  Europe.  These  in-
dustries  include:  electronics,  drugs,  aero-
space, chemicals, and electrical and mechan-
ical  engineering. 
"Moderate gainers" would be industries in 
which  Community  membership  would  have 
little  direct effect  (for example  in  construc-
tion  and  services,  where  greater  economic 
growth may be offset by higher labor costs). 
Industries which would make "notable gains" 
but  which  would  face  keener  competition 
outside  the  Community  and  suffer  from 
higher  wage  and  material  costs  include: 
motor  manufacturing,  shipbuilding,  textiles, 
and  retailing. 
"Possible losers" include:  industries whose 
tariff  protection  from  Community  competi-
tors  would  be  withdrawn,  such  as  scientific 
instruments;  industries  dependent  on  a  high 
proportion  of  imported  raw  materials, 
which could become more expensive, such as 
the paper and footwear industries; industries 
•  Do  you  theoretically  favor  the  creation 
of a European army comprising the different 
armies  of  Europe,  including  that  of  your 
country? 
Percentage  Favorable 
GERMAN 
teenagers  ····--··--··--···-········--··-········-·········  72 
parents  ... --··---·--········································  54 
FRENCH 
teenagers  ---···---·--···--··--·······--·············--·······  57 
parents  --··········---·····-·-····------····--··-···---·-····  47 
BRITISH 
teenagers  ··--·····-······--···········-······················  47 
parents  --······--·······························-········-···  32 
•  Should  the  government  of  a  united  Eu-
rope  have  the  right  to  decide  major  issues 
if  its  decisions  overruled  your  country's? 
Percentage Favorable 
GERMAN 
teenagers  ·-·-···-·---·····-···-········-·······-············- 50 
parents  _  -·-···-·····································-·······  37 
FRENCH 
teenagers  -·····--···································--·······  48 
parents  .. ---··---··---··········-···--······················  46 
BRITISH 
teenagers  ··----··-··--···------········-·····················  46 
parents  --······-·-·······------········-·······---···-···-···  21 
•  Has  the  Common  Market  so  far  had  a 
favorable  influence  on your life  in  general? 
Percentage Favorable 
GERMAN 
teenagers  ----·····----··-····--··-··········---···········-··  58 
parents  .....................................................  31 
FRENCH 
teenagers  ··--··-·--·-·····-··--·················-······--····  35 
parents  ··----········-···-·-··-········-·······-·-···········  21 
BRITISH 
teenagers  ··-··-··--·--··----·--···-····-·······-·····-···-···  27 
parents  ·-···-····-··--····················--·················  10 
expecting  a  sharp  rise  in  total  costs  and 
which  are  expanding  only  slowly,  such  as 
the  food,  confectionery,  and  brewing  in-
dustries. 
Overall,  the  Institute  of  Directors  ex-
pressed  confidence  that  membership  in  the 
Community would  hasten the growth of the 
British economy because it would form part 
of a  larger  market.  Rates  of growth  could 
be  expected  to  vary  from  sector  to  sector: 
•  above  average  growth:  general  and  elec-
trical  engineering,  oil  refining,  motor  ve-
hicles.  aircraft 
•  average  growth:  shipbuilding,  transport, 
communications,  textiles,  building  materials 
•  below  average  growth:  agriculture,  coal 
mining, food  processing, iron and steel,  27 1969 GRAIN HARVEST 
ESTIMATED  ABOVE  AVERAGE 
The  European  Community Statistical  Office 
has  estimated  the  Community's  1969  grain 
harvest at 59  million  metric tons, compared 
with an average of 55.8  million  tons during 
1964-68,  and  60.3  million  tons  last  year. 
However, heavy rains, especially in the north, 
may have impaired the quality of the harvest. 
The following  table shows the harvest re-
sults in millions of metric tons: 
1969  1964-68 
(forecast)  (average) 
Wheat  31.4  30.0 
Rye  3.7  4.1 
Barley  15.7  13.5 
Oats  8.3  8.0 
FORMATION  OF  A 
EUROPEAN  POLITICAL 






Members  of  West  European  Socialist  and 
other left-wing parties have formed  a  Euro-
pean  political  action  group  which  seeks  to 
create  a  progressive  European  party.  The 
group  will  submit  proposals  at  a  congress 
to be held  in  the  spring of  1970. 
Participants at  a  meeting  at Bemelen,  the 
Netherlands,  on  October  18-19  agreed  on 
the  need  to bridge  the  gap  between  the  in-
dividual and European institutions. They are 
also  working for direct elections  to the Eu-
ropean Parliament. 
PUBLICATIONS AVAILABLE 
L'HARMONISATION  DE  LA  LEGISLATION  DES 
DENREES  ALIMENTAIRES  DANS  LA  COMMU-
NAUTE  EUROPEENE.  European  Community 
Information  Service,  Brussels,  1969,  50 
pages  ......................................................  $  .25 
Describes  Community  activities  to  harmo-
nize  legislation  on  foodstuffs.  Discusses 
additives,  coloring  agents,  preservatives, 
packaging,  and  labeling. 
CONSULTATION AND  ADVICE  OF THE ECONOMIC 
AND  SOCIAL  COMMITTEE  ON  THE  GENERAL 
SITUATION  OF  THE  COMMUNITY.  Economic 
and  Social  Committee  of  the  European 
Communities, Brussels,  1969, 27  pages  ....  free 
PREMIERE  ORIENTATION  POUR UNE  POLITIQUE 
ENERGETIQUE  COMMUNAUTAIRE.  Commission 
of  the  European  Communities,  Brussels, 
1969, 196 pages ...................................... $3.00 
Reproduces  the  general  guidelines  for  a 
Community energy  policy.  Includes  two an-
nexes on the  actual situation  of the  market 
for  energy  and  the  fundamental  problems 
of  a  Community  energy  policy.  Discusses 
coal,  petroleum, gas,  electricity, and nuclear 
energy.  Available  in  French  and  German. 
CONVENTION  D'ASSOCIATION  ENTRE  LA  COM-
MUNAUTE  ECONOMIQUE  EUROPEENE  ET  LES 
ETATS  AFRICAINS  ET  MALGACHE  ASSOCIES  A 
CETIE  COMMUNAUTE  ET  DOCUMENTS  AN-
NEXES.  Commission of the  European  Com-
munities,  Brussels,  1969,  20  pages  .......  .free 
French  text of the second Yaounde Conven-
tion of Association between the Community 
and  17  African  states  and  Madagascar 
signed July  29,  1969.  The  English  text  will 
be  available  in  the  future. 
COMMERCE  EXTERIEUR:  PRODUITS CECA  1968. 
Statistical Office of the European Communi-
ties, Luxembourg,  1969,  569  pages ...... $4.0 
French/German/Dutch/Italian  text.  De<_ 
tailed  statistics  of  Community  imports  and 
exports of steel,  iron  ore,  manganese,  scrap 
metal,  and  coal.  Data  includes  country  of 
origin  and country of destination  as  well as 
regional groupings. 
REPORT  ON  THE  QUESTION  OF  COKING  COAL 
AND  COKE  FOR  THE  IRON  AND  STEEL  INDUS-
TRY  OF  THE  COMMUNITY.  Series  Energy-No. 
2,  Commission of the  European  Communi-
ties,  Brussels,  1969, 86  pages ................ $3.00 
Discusses  the  coking  coal  and  coke  needs 
of the  world's  steel  industry  and  means of 
meeting them, the contribution of the Com-
munity's  coal  mining  industry  to  covering 
the  requirements  of  the  Community's  steel 
industry,  and  the  implications  of  Decision 
No.  I /67  which  subsidized  Community 
coking  coal  and coke  delivered  to  the  iron 
and steel  industry.  The  situation and  future 
for  these  products from  the United States is 
analyzed.  Includes  a  large  statistical  annex. 
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